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The Results of Deliberation
MAGGIE WITTLIN*
ABSTRACT
When evaluating whether to sue, prosecute, settle, or plead, trial lawyers
must predict the future—they need to estimate how likely they are to win a
given case in a given jurisdiction. Social scientists have used mock juror
studies to produce a vast body of literature showing how different variables
influence juror decision-making. But few of these studies account for jury
deliberation, so they present an impoverished picture of how these effects
play out in trials and are of limited usefulness.
This Article helps lawyers better predict the future by presenting a novel
computer model that extrapolates findings about jurors to juries, showing
how variables of interest affect the decisions not only of individuals but also
of deliberative bodies. The Article demonstrates the usefulness of the model
by applying it to data from an empirical study of the factors that influence
juror decisions in acquaintance rape cases. This application first elucidates
a tension in criminal law: even if a substantial majority of jurors in a
community would vote to convict a defendant, a majority of juries might still
acquit. It also demonstrates that certain legal reforms will have a
meaningful effect in some areas of the country but not others, suggesting that
rape law reform should occur at a local, not national, level.
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INTRODUCTION
Trial lawyers frequently need to predict the future. “If I go to trial,” the
attorney must ask herself, “what are my chances of winning?” Prosecutors
aim to maximize their conviction rates: to win frequently and to lose very
rarely,1 so a prosecutor will charge a defendant with a crime only if he
believes there is a high probability a jury will convict. When a defense
lawyer helps his client decide whether or not to accept a plea bargain, he
engages in a complicated cost-benefit analysis, weighing the risk of
conviction and the severity of a sentence against the prosecution’s offer.2
Both the prosecutor and the defendant “bargain in the shadow of the jury,”
deciding which plea offers to make and take based on the chances of a
conviction.3 Civil litigants face similar calculations. In deciding whether to
sue in the first place and then whether to settle a case or proceed to trial,
parties estimate their odds of victory in front of a jury.4 Once the lawyer gets
to trial, she endeavors to select a jury that gives her the greatest probability of
success; and once the jury is empaneled, she tailors her trial strategy to
maximize her chances of getting a favorable verdict from that specific jury.5
1

Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966–69 (1997).
2
See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy:
Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103,
2167 (2003).
3
See Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 300 (1992).
4
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 7–9 (1984).
5
See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of
the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything,
To Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441, 453–55 (1999) (discussing the work of trial
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Lawyers have a number of tools to evaluate their likelihood of success.
They can review the outcomes of similar cases that they have tried, observed,
or researched and calculate the fraction won by the party in their position.6
They can attempt an objective comparison of the evidence of the defendant’s
wrongdoing to the legal decision standard.7 And they can predict behaviors
of individual jurors, either by looking at studies of how prospective jurors
might vote in a similar case or relying on their own (or their consultant’s)
understandings of which jurors are likely to vote which way.8
In this Article, I introduce a new tool and a new way to think about the
probability of success: a computer simulation that uses models of individual
juror voting to predict how a jury randomly drawn from a specified
community will come out in a given case. Psychologists and legal scholars
have produced a large body of “mock-juror” studies that examine how
variables of interest influence trial verdicts.9 But these studies rarely involve
actual juror deliberation; more often, the researchers simply present
individual subjects with questions about how they would vote in a particular
case. A program that extrapolates these results from individuals to
deliberative bodies allows lawyers to extract new and valuable information
from these studies: it allows them to predict the verdict of a jury drawn from
a pool that varies with respect to the variables of interest. If a study models
how different types of people react to differences in case strategy, a
deliberation simulation could predict chances of victory under different
strategies.
Lawyers are not the only ones who can gain useful knowledge from the
program. Social scientists who conduct mock-juror studies may strengthen
their conclusions and glean new implications of their research by observing
how findings about individuals play out in a group context. Scholars
frequently qualify the ecological validity of their studies by noting that
deliberation may alter their results.10 The program mitigates that nearly
consultants).
6
See Stuart S. Nagel, Lawyer Decisionmaking and Threshold Analysis, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 615, 618 (1982); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal
Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under
Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 673 (2006).
7
See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test the
PriestKlein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 461–62 (1995).
8
But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76 (2001)
(quoting Alan Dershowitz as saying, “Lawyers’ instincts are often
the least trustworthy basis on which to pick jurors. All those neat rules of thumb, but
no feedback. Ten years of accumulated experiences may be ten years of being
wrong.”).
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See, e.g., Daniel Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, The Impact of Case Factors on
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universal concern11 and allows researchers to argue more forcefully for
reforms based on their results.
Legislators and other policymakers
accountable to voters will want to pass laws that achieve certain outcomes,
including the conviction and sentencing of people who engage in conduct
that is offensive to voters.12 Legislators, then, will be interested in drafting
laws that not only nominally criminalize offenses in accordance with
individual voter preference but also translate that preference into postdeliberation jury convictions.
Although a number of researchers have used more basic computer
simulations to mimic deliberation and gain valuable insights into existing
research,13 the program introduced here has several key advantages over
earlier models. First, I employ a recently developed, more nuanced formula
for converting initial jury ballots into post-deliberation verdict probabilities.14
In contrast to earlier schemes, which required the researcher to choose from
Jurors’ Decisions in a Sexual Violent Predator Hearing, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 135, 143 (2014); Richard L. Wiener et al., Anticipated Affect and Sentencing
Decisions in Capital Murder, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 263, 278 (2014); David
L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An
Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 471 (2013); Emily C.
Hodell et al., Factors Impacting Juror Perceptions of Battered Women Who Kill
Their Abusers: Delay and Sleeping Status, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 356
(2012); Harmon M. Hosch et al., Effects of an Alibi Witness’s Relationship to the
Defendant on Mock Jurors’ Judgments, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 139 (2011);
Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical
Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 393, 414 (2010); Tisha R. A. Wiley & Bette L. Bottoms,
Effects of Defendant Sexual Orientation on Jurors’ Perceptions of Child Sexual
Assault, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 57 (2009).
11
The program does not eliminate the concern entirely. Some studies may
involve issues where deliberation is likely to have more or less of an effect than in a
generalized case.
See, e.g., Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 10, at 471
(hypothesizing that deliberation might allay juror confusion).
12
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 530–31 (2001).
13
See, e.g., Joseph W. Filkins et al., An Evaluation of the Biasing Effects of
Death Qualification: A Meta-Analytic/Computer Simulation Approach, 4 THEORY &
RES. SMALL GROUPS 153, 165–71 (2002); Scott Tindale & Dennis H. Nagao, An
Assessment of the Potential Utility of “Scientific Jury Selection”: A “Thought
Experiment” Approach, 37 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
409, 412–13 (1986).
14
The model is derived from Professor Robert MacCoun’s new BOP (“balance
of pressures” or “burden of (social) proof”) deliberation formula. See generally
Robert J. MacCoun, The Burden of Social Proof: Shared Thresholds and Social
Influence, 119 PSYCH. REV. 345 (2012) (developing a deliberation framework based
on the hypothesis that there is a shared sense of how much social opposition is
necessary before a deliberating person should change views).
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several rigid conversion formulas,15 the formula used herein is flexible,
allowing the verdict probability function to vary smoothly based on factors
such as the type of case (criminal or civil), decision rule, and jury size.
Second, unlike earlier programs, which assumed that all jurors had an equal
probability of voting a certain way,16 the program here more realistically
simulates a probability for each juror individually based on that juror’s
characteristics and the researcher’s data. In addition, the annotated code in
the Appendix allows scholars without a coding background to run
deliberation simulations in Stata17 by tweaking the program to fit their data
and question of interest.
I demonstrate the implications of this program by applying it to a mock
juror study of the factors that influence perception of consent in acquaintance
rape cases where the woman claims she said “no” but there was no physical
resistance. I demonstrate that a “no-means-no” law—a law providing that
the word “no” defeats a reasonable perception of consent—would have a
more meaningful impact in some locations than in others.18 This result
suggests that a national rape policy might not be ideal: certain states, those
with more egalitarian values, could benefit from a “no-means-no” reform,
while legislators in states with different cultural values should consider other
ways of altering norms before passing this sort of law. I also show how
prosecutors with differing levels of knowledge about community makeup
could determine whether a jury in their jurisdiction is likely to convict in a
case like the one studied. And my results offer a possible explanation for the
low rate of prosecution in acquaintance rape cases: even if a majority of
individuals in a community would convict, a majority of juries in that
community may acquit.
Part I of this paper reviews past efforts at jury deliberation models,
discusses the deliberation framework used here, and develops a flexible
computer program that simulates jury verdicts based on prior investigations
of the variables that influence individual jurors. Part II discusses the
15

See generally James H. Davis, Group Decision And Social Interaction: A
Theory Of Social Decision Schemes, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 97 (1973) (introducing the
Social Decision Scheme framework, in which the researcher chooses from a small
set of social decision matrices that convert initial votes to a probability of each
possible verdict).
16
See Kwangbai Park, Estimating Juror Accuracy, Juror Ability, and the
Relationship Between Them, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 288, 302 (2011); see also
Filkins et al., supra note 13; Tindale & Nagao, supra note 13, at 416 (assuming
jurors are chosen from discrete groups with certain voting probabilities).
17
Stata is a statistical software package that provides a number of tools for data
analysis, including multiple linear regression. See STATA: DATA ANALYSIS AND
STATISTICAL SOFTWARE, http://www.stata.com/ [https://perma.cc/29UG-PGZA] (last
visited Sept. 24, 2016).
18
See infra Part III.
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implications of this program for the many scholars who have studied mock
jurors and the institutional actors who could benefit from their research.
Finally, Part III demonstrates the usefulness of the program by applying it to
research on acquaintance rape. The Appendix includes sample code that,
when manipulated, allows interested persons to specify community
demographics and a model of juror voting and, given those specifications,
estimate the likelihood of conviction in an acquaintance rape case.
I. MODELING DELIBERATION
In this Part, I discuss the history of deliberation modeling and develop a
computer program that calculates how likely a jury from a specified
community is to find for one side in a specified case. The model—even
before it is applied to mock jury research—yields several interesting results.
It reveals that in civil cases, deliberation augments the overall preference of
the venire: if just over half of individuals would vote for the plaintiff,
decidedly more than half of juries would do so. In criminal cases,
deliberation augments deviations from some larger proportion, possibly
about two-thirds, voting for conviction: if two-thirds is the threshold, and if
60% of individuals would initially vote for conviction, far fewer than 50% of
juries will. What looks like a winning case from an individual perspective,
then, may be a losing case to the eye of an experienced prosecutor. The
program also shows that for close cases, deliberation exacerbates the
differences between communities—if individuals in one community are a
little bit more likely to convict than those in another, juries in the first
community will be much more likely to convict than juries in the second.
(For easy cases, deliberation mitigates the differences between communities
in individual preference.) In close cases, then, jury verdicts amplify the
unique voice of the community.
A. Efforts at Modeling Deliberation and Social Influence
With the knowledge that initial ballots are a strong but imperfect
predictor of verdicts,19 social scientists have been modeling group
deliberation—predicting how initial votes will convert to verdicts—for
decades.20 The most influential system for modeling group deliberation and
19

See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487–90
(1966); Diane L. Bridgeman & David Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An
Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 91, 94
(1979); Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation
Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 188
(1995).
20
See generally Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622
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decision-making, at least in the jury context, has been James H. Davis’s 1973
Social Decision Scheme (SDS) framework.21 SDS uses a social decision
scheme—a group’s express and implied rules of decision-making—to
translate probabilities of individual preference arrangements into
probabilities of final group choice.22 For example, in a “majority rules”
social decision scheme, the probability that choice A wins over choice B is
100% if more than half of the members prefer A, 50% if exactly half of the
members prefer A, and 0% if fewer than half of the members prefer A.23
Therefore, in a group of twelve people operating under a “majority rules”
scheme, if there is a 50% chance that eight people prefer A, a 40% chance
that six people prefer A, and a 10% chance that four people prefer A, there is
a 70% chance overall that choice A wins. Different decision schemes result
in different “decision matrices,” which translate individual preference
arrangement probabilities into group probabilities. For the social decision
scheme “truth wins out,” if even one group member prefers choice A, and
choice A is correct, there is a 100% chance that the group will choose A.24
SDS research has used several such schemes with predictable decision
matrices—including “majority rules” and “truth wins out”—as “benchmarks”
against which to measure actual group behavior.25
In his work, Davis suggested that researchers could use his framework in
conjunction with data on group decision-making behavior to determine actual
SDS matrices for decision-making bodies.26 The SDS matrix would then
yield insight into the groups’ decision-making processes.27 Indeed, since
Davis published his paper, researchers have used the SDS framework to
investigate questions of courtroom procedure, such as the effect of death
qualification on the likelihood of conviction in capital cases28 and the
efficacy of “scientific jury selection.”29 Other researchers have expanded on
the SDS framework in the jury context. For example, Norbert Kerr, Robert
MacCoun, and Geoffrey Kramer derived what MacCoun calls the Kerr

(2001) (providing a thorough overview of research on deliberating juries through
1999).
21
See Davis, supra note 15.
22
Id. at 101.
23
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 357 tbl.6.
24
See id.
25
See id. at 353, 357 tbl.6.
26
See Davis, supra note 15, at 114 (discussing the goal of using “all of the data,
group and individual, to obtain an estimate of the social decision scheme matrix
itself”).
27
See id at 114, 123.
28
See Filkins et al., supra note 13, at 165.
29
See Tindale & Nagao, supra note 13, at 416.
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Influence Model (KIM), an asymmetrical SDS matrix that accounts for
judgmental bias.30
While SDS and its progeny continue to be the dominant framework for
jury deliberation,31 other models have focused on deliberation processes. For
example Helmutt Crott and Joachim Werner’s Norm-Information-Distance
model32 predicts the probability an individual will transition from one choice
to another by taking into account the “relative subgroup size for the new
choice, the informational attractiveness of that choice, and the number of
alternatives intermediate between the original and the new opinion.”33 It then
translates individual transition probability into group transition probability.34
Still other researchers have modeled jury deliberations using computer
simulations. In a classic paper, Steven Penrod and Reid Hastie developed
DICE, a jury simulation program that allows users to vary several
parameters, including jury size, decision rule, and the initial probability that a
randomly-selected juror will initially vote to convict.35 With Nancy
Pennington, they designed the JUS program, an advanced version of DICE
that accommodated multiple verdict categories, including conviction of a
lesser charge.36
Other social psychologists have formulated influence models in settings
more general than the group deliberation context. Several of these models
aim to estimate how likely it is that an individual will conform to pressure
from an opposed group. Bibb Latané’s Social Impact Theory derives a
mathematical model from the established psychological premise that people
have diminishing marginal sensitivity to stimuli.37 Brian Mullen’s OtherTotal Ratio model stems from the hypothesis that when a person’s ingroup is
small compared to his outgroup, he will experience self-awareness, and when
his ingroup is large compared to an outgroup, he will experience

30

See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996).
31
Devine et al., supra note 20, at 625.
32
See Helmutt W. Crott & Joachim Werner, The Norm-Information-Distance
Model: A Stochastic Approach to Preference Change in Group Interaction, 30 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68 (1994).
33
See id. at 68.
34
Id.
35
See Steven Penrod & Reid Hastie, A Computer Simulation of Jury Decision
Making, 87 PSYCHOL. REV. 133, 134 (1980).
36
See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 175–226 (1983).
37
See Bibb Latané, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 343,
344 (1981). In Latané’s model, each additional source of influence has less impact
than the previous source; hence the decreasing marginal effect. See also MacCoun,
supra note 14, at 349 (discussing social impact theory).
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deindividuation.38 And Sarah Tanford and Penrod have derived the Social
Influence Model from their computer simulations.39
A different group of researchers have posited logistic “social threshold
models” for behaviors that take a binary form, where a person’s probability
of switching behaviors changes drastically as soon as the level of an
opposing group crosses a threshold.40 These models were not designed to
describe deliberation: Thomas Schelling developed a “tipping point” model
of racial segregation, where a person moves if the proportion of her
neighbors that are of a different race crosses a certain threshold, say, 50%.41
For convenience, he assumed in his model that all people had the same
internal threshold.42 Mark Granovetter developed a similar tipping point
model, but allowed thresholds to vary between people; they were either
uniformly or normally distributed.43 He applied his model in the context of
rioting.
In a recent paper, MacCoun develops a family of new social threshold
models that can be applied to jury deliberations.44 The deliberative models
successfully fit both the SDS “benchmarks” and the results of empirical
studies of social influence, including mock juror studies.45 MacCoun calls
this framework the BOP—“burden of (social) proof” or “balance of
pressures”—framework. He shows that a number of previous models—
including the Granovetter and Schelling threshold accounts and many of the
classic Davis social decision schemes—can be subsumed within BOP as
special cases.46 The BOP framework forms the basis of my computer model.
MacCoun begins his derivation with the well-supported social
psychological proposition that people are sensitive to social consensus
38

See Brian Mullen, Operationalizing the Effect of the Group on the Individual:
A Self-Attention Perspective, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 295–98 (1983)
(hypothesizing that when a person’s ingroup is small relative to the outgroup, that
person will be more likely to attempt to conform his behavior to perceived
standards); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 349 (discussing Mullen’s work).
39
See Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Influence Model: A Formal
Integration of Research on Majority and Minority Influence Processes, 95 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 189, 193 (1984); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 349 (discussing the
social influence model).
40
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 346.
41
See Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC.
143, 181 (1971); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361 (discussing Schelling’s
work).
42
See Schelling, supra note 41, at 149.
43
Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models for Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC.
1420, 1427 (1978); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361 (discussing
Granovetter’s work).
44
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 345, 361.
45
Id. at 353 tbl.3, 355 fig.5, 357 tbl.6, 358 fig.6.
46
Id. at 361.
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information and may change positions on an issue if they are faced with
opposing social consensus.47 While many factors, internal and external, may
influence an actor’s decision to switch positions, MacCoun excludes these
factors from the core of the model, stripping it down to a model solely in
terms of social influence.48
Like earlier threshold models, BOP posits that each person has a
threshold of social opposition, and once that threshold is crossed, the person
will be much more likely to change positions.49 MacCoun labels a person’s
net resistance to social pressure, b, for “burden of social proof,” and this
parameter operates as an internal threshold.50 If b is 0.5, and more than 50%
of the group is trying to change a person’s mind, that person will be likely to
switch.51 In the group context, b can be understood as an average internal
threshold.52
A second parameter, c, operates as an index of “norm clarity.”
Mathematically, a higher c gives the s-shaped probability function a sharper
slope (Figure 1), so that crossing the threshold has a more drastic effect on
the probability that a person will switch positions. MacCoun discusses two
possible psychological interpretations of c.53 First, a low c could denote an
internal lack of norm clarity: an individual’s resistance to social pressure may
be uncertain or unstable.54 Second, a low c could signify variation in b
across members of the deliberating body.55 An explicit voting standard or
standard of proof (such as “beyond reasonable doubt”) is likely to increase c,
because it will signal to members of the deliberating body an approximate
value for b, the burden of social proof.56

47

Id. at 346.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 346–47.
51
Id. at 346–48.
52
Id. at 346–47.
53
Id. at 348.
54
Id.
55
Id. In neural network research, a similar sigmoid function may represent
“neural firing rate.” As electric potential increases, the total firing rate for the neural
network increases. The “slope parameter,” equivalent to c in MacCoun’s model, is
the inverse of variance in underlying neuronal states: if there is very low variance,
the function has a sharp threshold—cross it and all of the neurons start firing. If
there is high variance, each increase in potential causes a few more neurons to start
firing. This interpretation of the slope parameter is equivalent to interpreting c as
variance in b between group members. See André C. Marreiros et al., Population
Dynamics: Variance and the Sigmoid Activation Function, 42 NEUROIMAGE 147,
149–50 (2008).
56
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 348.
48
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MacCoun combines his psychological premise—that people are
responsive to social consensus—and the parameters b and c to expand from
individuals to deliberative bodies. He derives a “bidirectional influence”
(bBOP) model for the likelihood that one side, here labeled “Sources,” will
win in a deliberation; the model takes the form of a logistic function:57

1

p(SourcesWin) =
1+ e

S 
−c −b 
N 

In the bBOP model, S is the number of sources—the number of group
members initially voting for the Source side—and N is the total number of
group members.58 The probability that S will win is therefore dependent on
the proportion of group members initially voting for S, the average internal
threshold b, and the “norm clarity” c. The bBOP equation is depicted in
Figure 1, with both a higher c (c = 20) and a lower c (c = 5).

57

See id. at 347 tbl.1. For a more mathematically rigorous derivation of the
BOP models, see id. at 347. MacCoun also demonstrates how BOP can be derived
from strict and random utility approaches, both of which lead to a logistic choice
model. Id. at 370 app. a. Kalven and Zeisel also found that the relationship between
first ballot votes and the likelihood of a given verdict took a somewhat sigmoid
shape. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effects of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30
STAN. L. REV. 491, 505 (1978).
58
MacCoun, supra note 14, at 346.
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Figure 1. MacCoun’s bBOP deliberation model when b = 0.5, with two
different values of c. When c is high, crossing the threshold of six jurors has
a very sharp effect on the probability that a jury will convict. When c is low,
the function is almost linear.59
With this bBOP model, MacCoun is able to replicate five of the most
common SDS benchmarks perfectly or to close approximation.60 To
replicate “majority rules”—where the initial majority is dispositive, and an
evenly-split group is equally likely to come out either way—set b to 0.5 and
set c to a very high value, say, 100.61 To replicate “truth wins”—where S
wins as long as at least one person votes for it initially—keep c high but set b
to 0.05.62
Additionally, the model can replicate the results of several social
influence experiments, including MacCoun’s own study of mock criminal
juries with Norbert Kerr.63 Fitting his data to bBOP, MacCoun finds that b is
0.62 and c is approximately 18.64 It is unsurprising that b in a criminal case
would be greater than 0.5, because the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
59

See id. at 350 fig.2.
See id. at 357 tbl.6.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, The Effects of Jury Size and Polling
Method on the Process and Product of Jury Deliberation, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 349, 355 tbl.2 (1985).
64
MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3.
60
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favors those arguing for acquittal.65 A number of studies have found this
“asymmetry effect,”66 although some empirical work has questioned this
leniency bias.67 MacCoun hypothesizes that this evidentiary burden of proof
translates into a social burden of proof, because when any substantial
minority votes to acquit, others might begin to suspect that there is, indeed,
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.68
While MacCoun’s model is founded on a sound psychological insight,
and is backed by empirical research on group decision-making, it does have
several limitations. First, it does not account explicitly for several factors
that could influence group deliberation, even given an initial vote
distribution, most notably the size of the jury and the decision rule.
However, by adjusting the parameters b and c, a researcher can account for
these factors. As noted above, to replicate the decision rule “majority rules,”
b should be set at 0.5 and c should be set to a high value: if one side has the
edge after the first vote, that side inevitably wins. A criminal jury has to
reach a unanimous decision that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.69 To replicate a jury deliberating under this higher burden of proof, b
should be set above 0.5—the burden of social proof falls on those advocating
conviction—and c should perhaps be set to a somewhat lower value, because
even one holdout has a chance of persuading her fellow jurors to come over
to her side.70 Still, c should likely not be too low, as studies of actual juries
65

See Robert J. MacCoun, Modeling the Impact of Extralegal Bias and Defined
Standards of Proof on the Decisions of Mock Jurors and Juries, 46 DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL 700B, 40 (1984).
66
See id.; Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock
Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
21, 30 (1988).
67
See generally Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is the Leniency
Asymmetry Really Dead?: Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury
Deliberation, 15 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 585 (2012)
(discussing work that questions the leniency asymmetry but demonstrating some
leniency effect, albeit one that may be less pronounced than originally believed);
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor et al., Are Hung Juries a Problem? THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 67 fig.5.2 (2002), http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/What-We
Do/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/Are%20Hung%20Juries%20
A%20Problem.ashx (showing a slight severity asymmetry).
68
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 354.
69
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
70
See Norman Rockwell, The Holdout, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Feb. 14,
1959, cover illustration. “What could be a most menacing scene is saved by the
young woman’s look. Her defiant crossing of the arms, cool demeanor, and upright
posture leave little doubt that while she may feel harried, it is the beseeching and
sermonizing male jurors who are wearing down and eventually must give way to her
will.” SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
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indicate that 90% of trials produce the verdict initially favored by a
majority,71 and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard provides an explicit
decision rule, which might increase norm clarity. Similarly, the model does
not account for jury-specific or case-specific factors that may influence
deliberation systematically, such as the race and gender composition of the
jury72 or the attractiveness of the defendant.73 Again, if we both had and
wished to employ concrete knowledge about how jury composition affects
deliberation, we could code the program to adjust the parameters b and c
automatically based on the composition of an individual, simulated jury.
The assumption in the model that group influence is directly proportional
to relative group size may be more troublesome. Absolute jury size does,
indeed, affect group deliberation, with smaller juries less likely to hang.74 It
seems likely that the parameter c might take a larger value in smaller groups,
as it would be easier for jurors to come to a common understanding about an
appropriate burden of social proof.
The bBOP model also does not account directly for influence that cannot
be predicted from demographic data, such as the presence of more persuasive
people on the jury, individual strength of conviction, or the style of
deliberation.75 But this does not pose a problem: like SDS, bBOP is a
probabilistic model. These stochastic factors, unique to every jury, explain
why one jury with ten people initially favoring conviction might acquit while
another might convict. bBOP tells us, overall, how many of these juries will
go one way and how many will go the other.
PENALTY 59–60 (2005).
71
See Devine et al., supra note 20, at 690.
72
See Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Impact of Mock Jury Gender Composition
on Deliberations and Conviction Rates in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 12 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 182, 185, 188 (2007); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity
and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on
Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 606 (2006).
73
Richard R. Izzett & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of
Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271,
275–76 (1974) (finding that before deliberation, mock jurors rendered a harsher
punishment against an “unattractive” defendant, but they became more lenient after
deliberation).
74
See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 63, at 359–60 (finding that smaller juries
are less likely to hang than larger juries and that very small groups use different
deliberation processes than larger groups); see also Devine et al., supra note 20, at
669–70 (discussing research on jury size and deliberation).
75
See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 143–
44 (2007) (discussing the differences between “verdict-driven” deliberation and
“evidence-driven” deliberation); Devine et al., supra note 20, at 701 (“Clearly, the
evidence-driven style is closer to the normative ideal desired by the courts; in
contrast, many juries adopt the verdict-driven style that seems most likely to lead to
the rapid delineation of factions and steadily increasing normative pressure.”).
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Finally, the model contains only a probability of conviction and does not
have a separate category for hung juries.76 Although only a small proportion
of juries hang—approximately 6 percent, according to the National Center
for State Courts77—this somewhat limits the realism of the bBOP model.
Despite these limitations, MacCoun’s model provides a workable,
theoretically sound, and empirically supported model of jury deliberation. It
incorporates the probabilistic nature of SDS research with the psychological
insight of social threshold models, while maintaining flexibility to different
decision rules and different distributions of internal thresholds within a
group. In the next Section, I incorporate the bBOP formula into a computer
simulation that calculates the likelihood that a jury from a specified
community will find for each side in a case.
B. A Computer Simulation of Jury Deliberations
The heart of this paper is a new computer simulation—coded in Stata
statistical analysis software—that uses information about what variables
influence juror verdicts in a particular case in order to predict how likely a
jury drawn from a specified community is to find for one side in that case.
The Appendix contains annotated Stata code for the program when it is set
up to calculate the likelihood that a jury will convict in an acquaintance rape
case, where the woman said “no” but did not physically resist the defendant.
This example is discussed in greater detail in Part III.
The program uses Monte Carlo simulations to produce a large sample of
juries and have them deliberate according to the bBOP formula. Monte
Carlo experiments are a class of computer algorithms that investigate the
properties of physical or mathematical systems by drawing random samples
from a specified domain, performing calculations on each sample, and
analyzing the results of those calculations in aggregate.78 For example, if
you wanted to know the probability of winning a game of solitaire,79 you
might set up a program that draws a thousand random initial distributions of
cards, plays through each game, recording whether the game was a win or
loss, and reports the proportion of games won. This would be easier than
trying to engage in a single analytic calculation of the probability of victory,
76

Accord Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 595 (discussing fitting a bBOP
model after dropping hung juries).
77
National Center for State Courts, A Profile of Hung Juries, 9 CASELOAD
HIGHLIGHTS
1
(2003),
http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What We Do/ caseload highlights hung
juries.ashx [https://perma.cc/WN33-75LK].
78
See generally Nicholas Metropolis & Stanislaw Ulam, The Monte Carlo
Method, 44 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 335 (1949) (developing the motivation for and
description of the Monte Carlo Method).
79
See id. at 336.
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an intractable problem.80 Statistical simulations are useful not only for
calculating point estimates but also for determining the confidence interval of
an outcome. After randomly generating 1000 outcome values that all
represent a single unknown quantity, the program could find the 95%
confidence interval for that quantity by ordering the outcomes lowest to
highest and reporting the value of the 25th and 976th outcome.81
The program developed in this paper allows a user to simulate the
probability that a jury will convict a defendant in a known case. In its
simplest form, which I call the Simple Simulation, or SimpSim, Program, it
calculates this probability in five steps:
1. The program specifies V, a population of jurors, or venire, with
desired demographic characteristics (percent male, average income,
etc.).
2. From this venire, the program draws 12 jurors—each with his or her
own characteristics.
3. The program uses a user-specified statistical model to simulate an
individual “first-ballot” verdict for each of the 12 jurors. This
produces an initial number of jurors, NC, that favor conviction.
4. The program uses MacCoun’s bBOP formula82 to calculate the
probability that a jury with NC jurors initially favoring conviction
will, indeed, convict the defendant.
5. The program repeats steps 2 through 5 one thousand times, to
simulate one thousand juries. It then averages the probabilities of
conviction from all of these juries to find an overall probability that a
jury drawn from V will convict.
SimpSim requires several user specifications. First, the user must
specify a model that uses individual characteristics to predict how likely it is
that a single juror will convict83 in the case. For example, if a researcher has
gathered data from research subjects on age, sex, political affiliation, and
whether the subject would convict a defendant in an acquaintance rape case,
the researcher could ask the program to run a logistic regression on her
data—with “convict” as the left hand variable and “age,” “sex,” and
80

Id.
See Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 349 (2000). To report
confidence intervals here, I use Stata’s “centile” function, which estimates specified
centiles.
82
See supra text accompanying note 57.
83
This model can be used for either civil cases or criminal cases, and in criminal
cases, it can output either likelihood of conviction or likelihood of acquittal. I use
“convict” here for convenience.
81
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“political affiliation” as right hand variables—and use the regression results
as her predictive model.
Second, the user must specify the characteristics of the venire. In the
above example, the user would specify the percent of the population that is
male, the average age and standard deviation of age, and percent of the
population that is Republican, Democrat, Independent, or unaffiliated. The
user could also specify correlations between these variables, to more
accurately represent that older people are more likely to also be registered
Republicans, for example.84 Specifying the venire can be technically
challenging.85
Finally, the user should specify the parameters b and c in the bBOP
model. For a civil case, where the “preponderance of the evidence” standard
gives neither side an advantage, b should be set to 0.5. In a criminal case,
however, where the jurors who want to convict have the burden of proof, b
should be set at a higher value. The precise threshold in a criminal case is
contested. Dennis Devine et al. suggest that in laboratory studies, acquittal is
all but inevitable if seven jurors or fewer favor conviction, and conviction is
highly likely if at least ten jurors favor conviction; if eight or nine jurors
favor conviction, the case is a toss-up.86 This would mean the threshold b is
between 0.67 and 0.75. When MacCoun fitted his model to his own mock
juror studies, he found that the best-fitting b was 0.62.87 Recently, Kerr and
84

The program, as written, does not account for jury selection and peremptory
challenges. If a user knew which classes of jurors would be acceptable or
unacceptable to the lawyers in the case, he or she could alter the venire accordingly.
Cf. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 57 (finding that voir dire will sometimes, but not
always, significantly affect the jury verdict).
85
If the user does not wish to specify correlations between variables, specifying
the venire is easy. For an 80% white, 20% black jury, each juror would draw a
random number between 0 and 1. If the number is less than 0.8, the juror is assigned
“white.” If it is greater than 0.8, he is assigned “black.” This is how I have created
venires for specified cities discussed infra—Binghamton, Bozeman, Berkeley, and
Oxford—and for the cultural model, see infra Figure 7.
For the remaining models, I have drawn variables from a normal distribution with
specified means and a correlation matrix derived from a nationally-representative
survey. I then convert those continuous variables into categorical or binary
variables. The Appendix shows an example of this conversion. In each instance, I
have verified that the resulting population has, on average, the characteristics I
wished to specify, by simulating large populations from the specified distribution
and observing summary characteristics.
86
See Devine et al., supra note 20, at 692. Devine and his coauthors question
the ecological validity of this leniency asymmetry, suggesting that it is insufficiently
supported in studies of real juries. Id. at 692–93. Kerr and MacCoun’s reanalysis of
real-world jury data indicates that acquittal bias still likely exists but may not be as
strong as it is in mock juries. See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 599.
87
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3.
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MacCoun investigated this “leniency bias,” looking at recent field studies,
and suggested it might be weaker, or at least more variable, than these studies
suggest.88 In my own simulations of criminal cases, I use b equal to 0.67
unless otherwise noted.89 Because this value is highly contested in the
literature, the results of the model presented here are primarily illustrative.
The level of norm clarity, c, in juries is also non-obvious. Several
factors, such as a unanimous decision rule, would counsel toward having a
low c, while others, such as an explicit decision rule like “beyond a
reasonable doubt” point to a high degree of clarity. In MacCoun’s analysis
of deliberation research, he found cs ranging from approximately 2 to 18.90
The c for his study of mock criminal juries was at the high end of that
range.91 Therefore, unless otherwise noted, I use a c of 18 in my own
models. When I discuss my findings, I will also discuss the implications of
varying c.
SimpSim should accurately produce a point estimate for the likelihood
that a jury from a specified venire will convict in a certain case. However,
the algorithm will not accurately calculate the standard error of that estimate.
The logistic model that, for each juror, produces a probability of initially
voting for conviction will have some error associated with it. If the model
came from a regression on a small sample, or if the model for some other
reason has uncertain regression coefficients, there is little reason to be
confident in the point estimate it produces. However, SimpSim uses the
logistic model to deterministically calculate the probability of conviction for
each juror, without attributing any error to that probability estimate.
Therefore, the only error in the entire algorithm that will show up in the final
point estimate will be sampling error—the error associated with drawing
only a small sample of all possible jurors and juries from the venire. By
increasing the number of juries sampled, a user can shrink that error
infinitely. This should not be: if the regression model is poor, that error
should emerge in the program’s output.
An altered version of the computer program, which I will call JurySim,
allows modeling error to show up in the standard error of the final point
estimate.
One way to think about the quality of a regression model is the
uncertainty of the parameter estimates, including estimates of the regression

88

See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 598.
With a high c, the sigmoid function has a fairly steep slope, see infra Figure 2,
so the probability a jury will convict is somewhat sensitive to the specific choice of
b. Additional research on actual criminal juries that pinpoints the precise value of b
would greatly help the accuracy of this model.
90
See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3.
91
See id. (noting c for Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 63).
89
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coefficients.92 If uncertainty about the coefficients is low, the model reveals
something meaningful about the relationship between the left hand variable
and the right hand variables. If the coefficients are very uncertain, this
means there is a wide range of possible “true” coefficients, and we have no
clear picture of how much the left hand variables and right hand variables
relate. A computer program could therefore account for modeling error if it
accounted for coefficient uncertainty, incorporating the range of possible
coefficients on each variable into the algorithm.
Statistical simulation can do just this. As noted above, simulation allows
an analyst to estimate a 95% confidence interval by looking at the 2.5th and
97.5th centile of results in a simulation of 1000 juries drawn from a specified
distribution. Instead of just drawing 1000 juries from a distribution specified
by our chosen venire, however, we could draw 1000 models from a
distribution specified by the coefficient estimates and variance-covariance
matrix93 produced by a logistic regression. Clarify, a statistical application
designed by Harvard government professor Gary King, simulates 1000 sets
of parameters, including regression coefficients, every time it runs a
regression.94 By running SimpSim once on each of 1000 simulated models,
obtaining one overall probability of conviction for each simulated model, a
researcher could determine a 95% confidence interval for the probability
estimate. The 25th smallest probability estimate would form the confidence
interval’s lower bound, and the 25th highest estimate would delineate an
upper bound.
Simulating 1000 juries 1000 times is unnecessarily resource intensive.
Stata would take hours to run the program, and comparable statistical power
can be achieved with a smaller sample. The number of models should be
enough to fill out the full distribution of simulated coefficients, so the model
accounts for the full uncertainty of the regression. The number of sampled
juries should be enough to fairly represent the population. The standard error
from sampling is:

SE =

( p)(1− p)
N

Assuming an overall probability estimate of 0.5, the error attributable to
sampling with 200 jurors per model is 3.5% for that model. For the 40,000
92

Cf. King et al., supra note 81, at 348–49 (discussing types of uncertainty in
the parameters).
93
Id. at 349. The variance-covariance matrix captures the extent to which the
parameters, including the regression coefficients, vary, and also the extent to which
they vary with each other.
94
See Michael Tomz et al., Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting
Statistical Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, June 2001, at 5–6 (2001),
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/clarify.pdf [https://perma.cc/G395-676M].
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juries produced by running 200 juries for each of 200 models,95 the sampling
error is 0.25%. This is very small compared to the uncertainty on the
coefficients of nearly any regression model of human behavior and can
usually be ignored. The JurySim model, then, is able to produce both
accurate point estimates and accurate confidence intervals.
C. Generalized Results
While the most interesting results of the JurySim model come from its
application to actual mock juror research, the SimpSim model yields useful
general information about how differences in venires interact with the
deliberation process. The SimpSim model can begin to tell us under what
circumstances deliberation will exacerbate differences between communities
and when it might mitigate those differences. Although much of this
information is inherent in the logistic shape of the bBOP curve itself,
SimpSim serves as a clarifying tool, expressing these results in a clear,
accessible way.
1. Civil Cases
Say we have three communities, A, B, and C, and three identical civil
cases, say, a false advertising suit96 against a drug company. In Community
A, 60% of the population is initially inclined to find for the plaintiff; in B,
70% is so inclined; and in C, 80% of jurors would find for the plaintiff. In
civil cases, the parameter b is set at 0.5. The probability of conviction for a
jury drawn from any one of these communities therefore depends only on (1)
the proportion of the venire who would initially vote to convict, and (2) the
value of the parameter c.97 SimpSim generates the results (Figure 2; Table
1).

95

Generating 40,000 individual model-jury pairs would achieve similar result. I
run multiple juries on a single model to highlight that modeling error and sampling
error are distinct, and both remove precision from the estimate.
96
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
97
This is an analytically tractable problem, so we do not actually need a
simulation to solve it. Using the binomial distribution and the probability that each
juror will vote for the plaintiff, p, we can determine what proportion of juries will
have each initial vote count—from 0-12 to 12-0. Then, using the bBOP formula, we
can determine, for each possible initial vote count, what proportion of juries with that
initial vote count will ultimately find for the plaintiff. The total proportion of the
juries that will find for the plaintiff is the sum of the products of these two numbers:
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Figure 2. The probability that a jury will find for the plaintiff, given the
proportion of the population initially prone to vote for the plaintiff, at two
values of c. For both, b = 0.5.
Community

Proportion
of
Community Pro-P

Proportion
Juries Pro-P

of Proportion
Juries Pro-P

(c = 6)

(c = 18)

A

0.60

0.63

0.73

B

0.70

0.74

0.88

C

0.80

0.84

0.97

of

Table 1. The proportion of each community that favors the plaintiff and the
proportion of juries from each community that find for the plaintiff.

See Eric W. Weisstein, Binomial Distribution, in MATHWORLD—A WOLFRAM WEB
RESOURCE,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BinomialDistribution.html
[https://perma.cc/2MAC-86PH] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
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Propor2on Vo2ng for Plain2ﬀ
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Figure 3. The proportion of individuals and juries that favor the plaintiff in
each community.
The deliberation process slightly augments the population’s preference
when c is 6, and it exacerbates the population’s preferences to a greater
degree when c is 18. When the population is disposed toward the plaintiff, as
these three communities are, an even higher percent of juries from that
community will find for the plaintiff.
More interestingly, the deliberation process sometimes augments and
sometimes attenuates differences between communities. We know that if the
community is split evenly in a civil case, juries will be evenly split as well.98
Deliberation therefore augments the difference between a 50% pro plaintiff
community and A, a 60% pro plaintiff community, and the augmentation is
greater when c is higher. (In the c = 18 case, a difference of ten percentage
points in individual preference turns into a 23 percentage point difference in
jury preference.) But when initial preference is far from the 50% mark,
deliberation may mitigate differences between juries. In the c = 18 case, a
ten percentage point difference between individuals in communities B and C
turns into a nine percentage point different between juries in those
98

Because the threshold parameter b is 0.5, juries split evenly will have a 50%
chance of finding for the plaintiff. The function is symmetric around this inflection
point, so an evenly split population—where a 4-8 initial vote is just as likely as an 84 initial vote—has no greater chance of producing a pro-plaintiff jury than a prodefendant jury, or vice versa.
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communities. And because 97% of juries in C convict, clearly the difference
between juries in community C and juries in a community where 90% of
individuals are pro-plaintiff cannot be greater than three percentage points.
Deliberation may therefore either accentuate or mitigate differences in
population preferences depending on how close to the threshold of 50% both
communities initially are. Around 50%, differences are accentuated, and far
from 50% differences are mitigated. This means that the most divisive
cases—those where the public is evenly split—will appear even more
divisive if they are allowed to play out in the courtroom. The extent to which
they are augmented or mitigated depends on the value of c, the norm clarity
parameter.
2. Criminal Cases

Probability a Jury Will Convict

The main structure of the bBOP model is the same for criminal cases as
for civil.99 However, the threshold parameter b is no longer set at 0.5. While
the precise value of b in a civil case is disputed, it is almost certainly greater
than 0.5 and less than 0.75.100 I set b at 0.67.

1
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Figure 4. The probability that a jury will convict, given the proportion of the
population initially prone to convict, at two values of c. For both lines, b =
0.67.
99

See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 354–55 (discussing social thresholds under
both a “beyond a reasonable doubt” and a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard).
100
See supra Part I.B.

184

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1

The main difference between criminal and civil cases is that in criminal
cases, differences between communities are exacerbated to the extent the
percentage of people in the community who would initially vote to convict is
close to this elevated b, here 67%. The closest cases in terms of population
preference—those that divide the community evenly—are not the closest in
deliberation when b exceeds 0.5. In the c = 18 scenario, if a population is
evenly divided on a criminal case, only 16% of juries will convict. And
moving from a community where 45% of individuals would initially vote to
convict to a community where 40% would initially vote to convict brings the
juror conviction rate down from 10.5% to 6.2%, slightly mitigating the
difference between individual preferences in those two closely-divided
communities.
Two-thirds of the community will need to favor conviction for there to
be even a 50% chance that a jury drawn from that community will convict.
If a prosecutor requires a much higher chance of victory before he is willing
to risk a loss on a case, he will probably want upwards of 80% of the
population initially favoring guilt, which will give him a comparable chance
of winning the case at trial. What the population at large sees as a “close
case” can differ drastically from what a prosecutor sees as a close case.
Prosecutors, having seen many cases, probably have a good sense of
whether a case falls to the right of the inflection point, giving them a highly
likely win, or to the left of the inflection point, giving them a likely loss.
Prosecutors will likely disagree with each other only in a narrow range, right
around the inflection point of 67 percent. Slight shifts in the proportion of
the venire inclined to convict translate into great differences in the overall
probability of conviction.
The next Part steps away from these generalizations to examine how the
bBOP model and JurySim could help researchers who have studied the
effects of variables of interest on individual jurors. But it will be useful to
keep in mind the generalized findings of this Part: when the proportion of a
large community that initially favors conviction is close to the bBOP
threshold, deliberation will exacerbate differences between sub-communities;
and while a criminal case that divides a community evenly may seem like a
close case to the people in that community, a prosecutor is likely to recognize
the case as a losing bet.
II. GETTING MORE OUT OF STUDYING INDIVIDUALS
In an ideal world, researchers interested in the factors that influence jury
decision-making would bring full mock juries into the lab and have them
deliberate after viewing or reading about a trial. However, full mock jury
studies are expensive and difficult to organize, so researchers rarely study
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juries engaged in live deliberation.101 Instead, a large body of research has
studied mock jurors, individual subjects who are presented with written or
visual material and asked to make decisions about how they would vote on a
jury. These studies have examined juror responses to everything from the
weight jurors afford eyewitness testimony102 to factors in corporate behavior
that influence whether jurors in a civil case will impose punitive damages.103
While several scholars have expressed concern about the ecological validity
of jury simulations that do not allow for deliberation,104 researchers continue
to examine individual mock jurors to draw conclusions about behavior that,
in the real world, always has a deliberative component.105
The JurySim algorithm gives scholars a new way to understand findings
about individual decision-makers when those individuals will actually
deliberate before making decisions. Although studies of jurors rely on the
intuition that deliberative bodies from a community will mirror individuals
from that community, JurySim breaks that intuition by demonstrating how
juries sometimes diverge from jurors. It allows us to extrapolate studies of
individuals to deliberative bodies in a more realistic, telling way. This Part
101

See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really
Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1022 (2003). But see Devine et al., supra note 20, at 627–
65 tbls.1–5 (collecting studies where mock jurors deliberated, along with studies of
actual juries).
102
See, e.g., Paul Skolnick & Jerry I. Shaw, A Comparison of Eyewitness and
Physical Evidence on Mock-Juror Decisionmaking, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 614,
621-23 (2001).
103
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 552–59 (2000) (discussing a survey that examined whether mock jurors
were more or less lenient on corporations that had conducted cost-benefit analysis on
a product prior to an accident).
104
See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is
the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 75–76 (1999); Shari Seidman
Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 561, 564–65 (1997).
105
See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An
Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1162–63
(2016) (discussing lack of deliberation as a limitation but concluding that
“having mock jurors deliberate before rendering a verdict is not likely to change the
observed pattern of verdicts across conditions”); Casey L. Magyarics et al., The
Impact of Frequency of Behavior and Type of Contact on Judgments Involving a
Criminal Stalking Case, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 602, 611 (2015) (acknowledging
this limitation and noting that Diamond, supra note 104, found “individual jurors’
beliefs often reflect the entire jury’s decision.”); Jeremy W. Bock, Does the
Presumption of Validity Matter? An Experimental Assessment, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
417, 451 (2015) (recognizing that lack of deliberation might affect the results of
mock juror study and suggesting future work ask mock jurors to deliberate).
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explores mock juror studies and discusses how computer simulations could
extract useful information from existing research.
A. How Informative Are Mock Juror Studies?
In most mock juror studies, subjects do not deliberate with each other
before deciding on a verdict—they simply express an individual
preference.106 In The American Jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel report
interviewing jurors after 225 trials and finding that, “with very few
exceptions the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict.”107 “And if this
is true,” they argue, “then the real decision is often made before the
deliberation begins.”108 MacCoun’s bBOP formula and my resulting
computer simulations do not contradict this generalization. If c, the
function’s slope parameter, is high, and if b is close to 0.5, the vast majority
of final verdicts will accord with the first ballot. Because b is greater than
0.5 in criminal cases, juries in which a slight majority initially favor
conviction are likely to acquit in the end.109
The conclusion that final verdicts usually follow first ballots means that
we can gain useful information from learning how individuals will vote. If
most individuals on a jury will favor the plaintiff, given certain evidence, that
jury, too, will likely favor the plaintiff. Even so, mock juror studies still
leave us with several open questions that can be answered by computer
simulations of deliberation.
First, there is the simple question of
extrapolating “percentage of people” to “percentage of juries.” In a
community where 40% of the population would initially vote for the
plaintiff, only 34% of juries would have at least six jurors initially voting to
convict, and less than 16% of juries would have at least seven. In a “majority
rules” decision scheme, then, only about 25% of juries would find for the
plaintiff.110 Second, how much more likely is a jury to find for the plaintiff
106

Cf. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407, 432 (2013) (“Some of the mock jury experiments on evidentiary
instructions assign the subjects to jury panels and have them deliberate before
reaching their final decisions. But most do not.”).
107
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487, 488 (1966)
(emphasis omitted).
108
Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted).
109
See MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 66, at 30 (“factions favoring acquittal are
more influential than comparably sized factions favoring conviction”).
110
These percentages can be calculated either analytically or via computer
simulation. To calculate the probability that exactly six jurors will vote for the
plaintiff, when 40% of the population would initially vote for the plaintiff, use the
formula:
12!
P(X = 6) =
(0.4)6 (1− 0.4)(12−6)
6!(12 − 6)!
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when eight members initially vote that way than when seven members
initially vote for the plaintiff? Since juries don’t actually vote on a “majority
rules” scheme, it is useful to know which cases have a significant chance of
flipping during deliberation and which do not. This is particularly relevant in
criminal cases where “close” cases usually come out as acquittals.
Third, and most informatively, simulations allow a researcher to define a
complex community with specified distributions of characteristics that affect
individual juror votes. For a study that examines the influence of a single,
binary variable on juror voting, it may be possible to calculate analytically
the effect of that variable on an expected jury vote.111 For a more
complicated study that models juror behavior based on traits that are
distributed both within and between populations, a simulation more easily
allows a researcher to determine how a certain case would come out in a
specified community or how much difference a procedural intervention
would make in a given community.
While simulations can add information to mock juror studies, those
studies inevitably have shortcomings unrelated to lack of deliberation, and
these shortcomings will not be solved by computer simulation. For example,
one study found that when mock juries hearing a school disciplinary
proceeding knew they were participating in a study, they behaved differently
from mock juries who believed they actually had the power to expel a
student.112 Other researchers have cited concerns such as the mock juror
sample (often subjects are undergraduates), the presentation of trial evidence
(often subjects read summaries instead of witnessing trials), and the type of
outcome variable (often subjects report a dichotomous judgment where a
probability-of-guilt estimate might be more informative).113 Although
research has shown little difference between mock juror studies using
different juror samples or trial media,114 these elements of ecological
invalidity counsel against relying on mock juror—or even mock jury—
studies as perfect predictions of real-world behavior. Still, by isolating the
influence of variables of interest on mock juror verdicts, these studies allow
us to forecast how real juror verdicts may vary across different conditions.

See Weisstein, supra note 97.
111
Without Clarify’s model simulations, however, such an estimate would not
contain an accurate confidence interval.
112
See David L. Breau & Brian Brook, “Mock” Mock Juries: A Field Experiment
on the Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 83, 87
(2007).
113
See Bornstein, supra note 104, at 75–76.
114
See id. at 88 (“few differences have been found as a function of either who the
mock jurors are or how the mock trial is presented”).
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B. Studies That Could Benefit from Simulation

A number of studies have looked at how certain variables influence the
likelihood that jurors will vote to convict a defendant. One study showed
that mock jurors weigh eyewitness testimony more than hearsay evidence.115
The authors found that after watching a videotape of a trial, 62% of subjects
who were presented with eyewitness testimony voted to convict, where only
40% of subjects who heard hearsay evidence would have convicted.116 With
circumstantial evidence alone, 36% of subjects voted to convict.117 The
authors argued that their results may support hearsay reform.118 A similar
study found that jurors are influenced more by physical evidence than by
eyewitness testimony, and found that jurors were more likely to convict after
learning of damning physical evidence (84%) than after reading about
eyewitness testimony (67%).119 These researchers could expand their finding
from individual jurors to juries, setting b to an appropriate value and finding
the overall probability of conviction in their study cases under the two
conditions. Authors who support hearsay reform could bolster their
recommendation by showing how in a case like the one presented, where a
decided minority of subjects would favor conviction based on circumstantial
evidence alone, the addition of hearsay evidence would not drastically
change the number of juries who would convict; that number would remain
low.
Simulations can allow researchers to extrapolate findings of studies that
evaluate the effects of personal characteristics of jury members, such as
race,120 from individuals to populations with specified racial distributions.
Samuel Sommers found that white jurors’ initial votes are influenced not
only by their own race and the race of the defendant, but by the races of their
fellow jurors.121 A simulation could include this effect of the racial
115

See Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1992).
116
Id..
117
Id. at 692.
118
See id. at 699–700. (suggesting their findings imply that jurors generally do
not overvalue hearsay, and while more research is needed before hearsay reforms are
implemented, their results at least have implications for harmless error analysis).
119
See Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 102, at 622; cf. Brian H. Bornstein et al.,
Intuitions about Arousal and Eyewitness Memory: Effects on Mock Jurors’
Judgments, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 120 (2008) (finding that mock jurors’
beliefs about whether arousal helps subsequent memory retrieval interact with an
eyewitness’s reported arousal level when they evaluate eyewitness testimony; also
finding that a positive main effect exists for eyewitness arousal and perception of
credibility).
120
See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 101, at 1002.
121
See id. at 1028 (discussing Samuel R. Sommers, Race and Juries: The Effects
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composition of the jury in its prediction of individual juror first ballot votes.
It could thereby help the researchers demonstrate how racial bias could affect
criminal trials in different communities.
Simulations based on the bBOP deliberation formula are not useful for
mock juror studies without dichotomous outcomes. MacCoun’s threshold
model predicts only the probability that an individual will switch from one of
two choices to the other.122 So while a number of studies have examined
factors that affect the level of sanction jurors impose on defendants,123
JurySim cannot predict how deliberation will act on individual appraisals of
appropriate damages. The next section, however, discusses a body of
research perfectly styled to benefit from computer simulations based on
MacCoun’s framework.
C. JurySim and Cultural Cognition Research
While the JurySim algorithm is useful for extracting additional
information from any mock juror study, the code is particularly useful for
studies that investigate how variation in juror characteristics affects
individual verdicts. Several studies by the Cultural Cognition Project, a
group of researchers that is based at Yale Law School, have done just this,124
and they provide a fruitful example of how JurySim can enhance research on
individual jurors. These studies examine how cultural values influence juror
fact perceptions and thereby affect juror verdicts.125 JurySim can illuminate
how these values—and the demographic characteristics they interact with—
play out in real-world juror situations, including how jury verdicts will vary
between communities. These results have implications for the normative
recommendations in cultural cognition studies.
“Cultural cognition” refers to the influence of individuals’ group cultural
commitments on their factual beliefs.126 When people sit in judgment in a
of Race-Salience and Racial Composition on Individual and Group Decision-Making
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)).
122
MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361.
123
See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 103, at 556–57 (finding that mock jurors
imposed higher damages on a corporation in a tort suit if the corporation had
engaged in cost-benefit analysis during product design); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108
YALE L.J. 1775, 1776 (1999) (noting that people report a desire for harsher penalties
in the abstract, but, when acting as mock jurors, suggest penalties below the
recommended minimum).
124
See infra notes 130–150, 225–263 and accompanying text.
125
See id.
126
See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What,
and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732 (2010)
(“‘Cultural cognition’ refers to the influence of group values on individuals’
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courtroom, they must infer facts—the events that transpired, the mental states
of parties at various points—based on the evidence presented. Individuals
are psychologically motivated to conform their factual perceptions to their
cultural values, confirming that the world works in the way they expect it
should.127 For the same reasons that individualistic, pro-business citizens are
less likely to believe that we are at risk from anthropogenic climate
change,128 and people who subscribe to egalitarian values are more likely to
believe that widespread gun possession poses a large safety risk,129 jurors’
perceptions of legally consequential facts will reflect their cultural
commitments.
A significant body of research investigates how cultural cognition
influences juror decision-making. In each study, researchers map subjects’
cultural values along two dimensions, derived from the work of
anthropologist Mary Douglas.130 One dimension measures “hierarchy”
versus “egalitarianism”: does the subject subscribe to a traditional social
ordering, where a person’s social role is determined by conspicuous
characteristics such as sex and class, or does the subject subscribe to a
worldview that rejects distinctions in obligations and entitlements based on
these fixed traits?131 The other dimension measures “individualism” versus
“communitarianism”: does the person value self-sufficiency and resent
government intervention, or does the person believe that society should both
assist and restrict individual members in pursuit of the collective good?132
The studies then evaluate how the subject’s positions along these two
axes influence his or her perceptions of facts, both on their own and in
interaction with his or her demographic characteristics and study
manipulations.133 The research stimulus puts the subject in the role of a
perceptions of facts.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) (“Essentially, cultural
commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political issues.”).
127
Kahan, supra note 126, at 732.
128
See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 297
(2010).
129
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition:
Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
465, 481 fig.3, 505 (2007).
130
See generally MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN
COSMOLOGY (Routledge, 2d ed. 1996).
131
See Kahan & Braman, supra note 126, at 153–54.
132
See id. at 153.
133
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism
and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 883–84, 900 (2012)
[hereinafter Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”] (finding values influenced whether
subjects perceived videotaped protesters as engaging in activity that would constitute
constitutionally protected “speech” or unprotected “conduct,” conditional on whether
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juror,134 asking for a determination of a legally relevant fact or conclusion
and finding cultural correlates. Because certain demographic characteristics
both correlate with cultural values and influence juror fact perceptions—on
their own and in interaction with culture—computer simulations can show
how juries are likely to come out on these cases in different communities.
For example, one study found a correlation between cultural values and
whether a subject, after watching a video of a police car chase, perceived that
the fugitive—a plaintiff in a civil suit—posed such a threat to public safety
that the police were justified in using deadly force to stop him.135 This
investigation arose from a case in the United States Supreme Court, Scott v.
Harris.136 Victor Harris, a motorist who fled from the police in a high-speed
chase, had sued police officer Timothy Scott, who stopped the chase by
ramming his vehicle into Harris’s, paralyzing Harris from the neck down.
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, held that no reasonable jury
could fail to find that Harris posed a serious and immediate risk to public
safety; Scott was therefore justified in using deadly force against him.137
Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, suggested that reasonable juries could
differ about whether Harris posed a lethal threat.138 In support of the
majority’s holding, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of posting a
video139 to its website. Justice Scalia wrote that the majority was “happy to
allow the videotape to speak for itself,”140 and directed readers to the website.
A nationally representative group of subjects viewed the video. The
researchers then asked the subjects whether Harris’s driving put police and

they were told the protest was against an abortion provider or a military recruitment
facility); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 869–79 (2009)
[hereinafter Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?]; Kahan, supra
note 126, at 773–93.
134
See, e.g., Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”, supra note 133, at 863; Kahan
et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra note 133, at 849; Kahan, supra
note 126, at 765.
135
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra note 133, at 879–
80.
136
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
137
Id. at 380.
138
Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139
Videotape: Scott v. Harris (United States Supreme Court 2006),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx [https://perma.cc/6KEK-TSEU].
While
Scalia’s
opinion
points
readers
to
the
address
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.html
[https://perma.cc/Q46A-WH5C], the Court’s webmaster apparently failed to provide
a redirect page when the Court switched to the www.supremecourt.gov
[https://perma.cc/X6KL-SFR9] domain.
140
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5.
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members of the public at a serious risk of death.141 Most subjects agreed
with the Court; 73% said they at least moderately agreed with the statement,
“During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the public
at great risk of death.”142 The subjects that disagreed, however, were not
randomly distributed throughout the population.
Instead, they were
disproportionately
African-American,
female,
egalitarian
and
communitarian.143 The authors drew up a profile of “Linda,” a black social
worker from Philadelphia who is a registered Democrat and self-identified
“liberal.”144 According to their analysis, fewer than one half of the people
who share Linda’s characteristics would moderately or strongly agree that
Harris posed a deadly threat.145
The study authors criticize the court for deciding this case, in which
different cultural groups may perceive facts in different ways, through
summary judgment:
By insisting that a case like Scott be decided summarily, the
Court not only denied those citizens an opportunity, in the
context of jury deliberations, to inform and possibly change
the view of citizens endowed with a different perspective. It
also needlessly bound the result in the case to a process of
decision-making that deprived the decision of any prospect
of legitimacy in the eyes of that subcommunity whose
members saw the facts differently.146
The authors recommended that judges attend to cues that a particular
subcommunity might be outraged if judges privilege their own factual
perceptions above those of the community.147 If a judge can conjure a mental
image of a dissenter—that person’s race, sex, socioeconomic status, or
political affiliation—he should evaluate his own perceptions with humility,
and consider sending the case to a jury.148
My computer simulation expands on the findings of this study and
reinforces its normative implications by showing that the deliberative process
would likely not mitigate the polarization between white hierarchs and
“Lindas.”
It is not clear whether any heightened differences after
deliberation would actually increase the perception of illegitimacy, as people
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra note 133, at 857.
Id. at 865 fig.2.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 841–42.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 898–99.
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generally experience and voice their opinions outside of the deliberative
context. In other words, members of a minority group will not know how a
jury from their own community would come out. However, juries—
especially those comprised of members from a traditionally underrepresented
community—perform several valuable democratic functions. When a
minority subcommunity makes a decision that carries the force of law, it
contributes to the marketplace of ideas, engages in self-governance, and
expresses its values with a rare degree of visibility.149 In other words, it
participates in the democratic process. By denying a jury the opportunity to
express itself through a verdict, a judge denies the subcommunity an
opportunity to participate in this way. However, if the deliberative process
strongly mitigates the differences between different communities, we might
be less concerned about the opportunity denied, which wasn’t much of an
opportunity at all: a jury from a majority-majority community would be
almost as likely to find for the plaintiff as a majority-minority community.
But JurySim does not assuage these concerns; it may even exacerbate
them. Figure 5 compares juries from a majority African-American, majority
Democrat, middle-class, majority female, northeastern community with
juries from an overwhelmingly white, majority Republican, relatively
wealthy, Western, community.150
149

See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(2005); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1099, 1162 (2005).
150
The “Pro-Defendant” Community is loosely based on Colorado Springs,
Colorado, which is 80% white, and 51% female, where 35% of the population has a
bachelor’s degree, and where the median household income is around $53,000. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Colorado Springs city, Colorado,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0816000
[https://perma.cc/7RP3-8CGK]. Registered voters in El Paso County, Colorado, are
about
two-thirds
Republican.
See
El
Paso
County:
Election,
http://car.elpasoco.com/election. The “Pro-Plaintiff” Community is loosely based on
Baltimore, Maryland, which is 63.4% black and 53.5% female, where 25% of the
population has a bachelor’s degree, although 76% have graduated from high school,
and where the median household income is around $39,000. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Fact Sheet: Baltimore city, Maryland, http://1.usa.gov/iroBe9. AfricanAmericans may be underrepresented in the jury pool. Baltimore, for example, draws
its jury pool from voter registration lists and lists of statewide identity card holders,
and disqualifies anyone who has convicted of a crime that carries a sentence of six
months or more. See Robert M. Bell, Order Adopting Revised Plan for Random
Selection
of
Jurors
in
Baltimore
City
(2010),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/juryservice/juryplans/baltimorecity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PZ5-46KF].
This selection process may disproportionately
exclude African-American men, in particular, as they are more likely to have been
imprisoned. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook
of
Criminal
Justice
Statistics
2009,
at
tbl.6.33.2009,

194

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1

Propor2on of Juries Finding for
Plain2ﬀ

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

Pro-PlainGﬀ

0.3

Sample Average
Pro-Defendant

0.2
0.1
0
Individuals

Juries

Figure 5. How deliberation affects the difference between cultural
communities in the Scott v. Harris case. The “Pro-Plaintiff Community” is
53% female, 60% African-American, 70% Democrat, Northeastern, and has
an average education of some college, and an average household income of
between $35,000 and $40,000. The “Pro-Defendant Community” is 50%
female, 80% white, 70% Republican, Western, and has an average education
of some college and an average household income of between $50,000 and
$60,000.
Jurors from an egalitarian, African-American community are more likely
than jurors from a hierarchical, white community to find for Harris, but more
importantly, juries from the former community are similarly, perhaps even
more likely to find for Harris than juries from the latter. Indeed it is juries,
not jurors, who would decide. Because the coefficients on the regression
model predicting individual votes have sizeable standard errors—we do not
know the independent effects of different traits with a great amount of
precision—the program yields large confidence intervals. This is especially
true for juries from the pro-plaintiff community: Close to 50% of individuals
from that community would find for the plaintiff. As we have seen, the
logistic bBOP curve amplifies differences close to b—here, 0.5. So small
differences in the regression model produce large differences in the
proportion of juries we expect will find for plaintiff. But for most of the
simulated models, the difference between juries in the pro-plaintiff and prohttp://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6332009.pdf
3GZP].

[https://perma.cc/E9CH-
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defendant communities is larger than the difference between individuals in
those communities. If we believe the law should make room for the voices
of these communities, the computer algorithm based on MacCoun’s model
lends further support to the thesis from the cultural cognition paper: judges
should maintain a degree of humility and pause before denying a jury the
opportunity to hear a potentially culturally divisive case.
However, the model points to a different conclusion when communities
are polarized but both heavily disposed toward the same side (say, 1%
favoring the plaintiff in one subcommunity and 20% favoring the plaintiff in
another). In both of these cases, very few juries will opt for the plaintiff.
While a decision to take the case from the jury could still delegitimize the
court in the eyes of the second subcommunity—a valid concern—it cannot
realistically be understood to be taking a decision out of their hands. This
subcommunity would almost certainly find the same way as the court did.
These simulations could be even more useful when applied to other
cultural cognition studies. In the next Part, I examine how JurySim, in
conjunction with the Cultural Cognition Project’s study of acquaintance rape,
can generate results useful to scholars, lawyers, and legislators.
III. MODELING ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: A CASE STUDY
In the prototypical case of rape, a woman walking alone at night is
approached by a stranger with a weapon, who pulls her out of public view
and, overcoming her determined physical resistance, forces her to have sex
with him.151 As recent news stories about sexual assault have highlighted,152
few actual instances of rape follow this pattern.153 In 2008, fewer than onethird of female rape victims did not know their assailant before the attack.154
151

Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, A Stranger In The Bushes, Or An
Elephant In The Room? Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom In
The Context Of A Mock Jury Study, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 781, 782–83 (2010).
152
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on and off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 2, 8
(2015) (noting the new national conversation about non-stranger rape); see, e.g.,
Noreen Malone & Amanda Demme, ‘I’m No Longer Afraid’: 35 Women Tell Their
Stories About Being Assaulted by Bill Cosby, and the Culture That Wouldn’t Listen,
NEW YORK MAGAZINE (July 26, 2015), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/07/billcosbys-accusers-speak-out.html [https://perma.cc/6QRV-54PV]; Matt Hamilton,
Former Stanford Swimmer Convicted of Sexually Assaulting Unconscious Woman on
Campus, L.A. TIMES (March 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meln-former-stanford-swimmer-convicted-sexually-assault-20160330-story.html
[https://perma.cc/FJT5-UUH3].
153
See Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625,
625–27 (2005).
154
MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 22777, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 5 tbl.6 (2009),
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More commonly, the perpetrator is someone the woman knows.155 And
sometimes the victim does not put up a forceful physical resistance, and the
perpetrator is not carrying a physical weapon.156 When a rape follows this
latter pattern—where the victim knows her assailant and does not forcefully
resist—a jury may be reluctant to convict, because the jurors don’t perceive
lack of consent. Even though the woman said “no,” they reason, she might
not have meant “no”; she might have communicated consent through her
actions.157 If juries are unlikely to convict in these cases, prosecutors may be
understandably reluctant to bring charges against perpetrators of
acquaintance rape who encountered only verbal resistance.
In this Part, I review the relevant scholarly discussion of the
acquaintance rape issue158 and discuss some of the issues lawyers and
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL6W-4KFP].
155
Id. (noting that 42% of rapes were committed by a friend or acquaintance of
the victim, and 18% were committed by an intimate partner of the victim). In this
paper, I limit my discussion to rape committed by men against women. Men make
up approximately one-fifth of rape and sexual assault victims. Id. However, the
study I incorporate into my simulations addressed a case of male-on-female rape;
therefore, any results that my simulations yield do not necessarily apply to male-onmale or female-on-male sexual assault. It is likely, however, that the mechanisms of
cultural cognition would influence perceptions of consent in male-on-male rapes as
well as in male-on-female rapes. See, e.g., Damon Mitchell et al., Attributions of
Victim Responsibility, Pleasure, and Trauma in Male Rape, 36 J. SEX RES. 369, 371–
72 (1999) (finding that subjects attributed more responsibility, more pleasure, and
less trauma to a homosexual male rape victim than to a heterosexual victim).
156
Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot, What Is Acquaintance Rape?, in
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 9, 10 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer
eds., 1991)
157
See Jacquelyn W. White & John A. Humphrey, Young People’s Attitudes
Toward Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 43, 52
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
158
The conversation about acquaintance rape extends far beyond what is
addressed here. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1294–1377 (1997) (focusing
on false rape reports, the burden of proof, and victim behavior as “three pervasive
issues” relating to leniency in acquaintance rape cases). And academic discussion of
rape extends far beyond acquaintance rape. Articles within just the last few years
have addressed topics as diverse as preventing prison rape and teaching rape law.
See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630 (2012)
(addressing sexual abuse in prisons perpetrated by women); Helim Kathleen Chun &
Lindsey Love, Rape, Sexual Assault & Evidentiary Matters, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
585 (2013) (discussing rape shield laws); Jennifer M. Denbow, The Pedagogy
of Rape Law: Objectivity, Identity and Emotion, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16 (2014)
(addressing teaching rape law at law schools); Corey Rayburn Yung, How To Lie
with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014)
(finding that many police departments undercount reported rapes).
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legislators face when determining how to prosecute or write laws that enable
prosecution of these cases.159 I then discuss a Cultural Cognition Project
study of juror perceptions in acquaintance rape cases and show how the
JurySim program can model acquaintance rape juries under a variety of
specifications. I derive several substantive conclusions. First, a “no-meansno” reform, where consent is defeated by evidence that the woman said “no,”
is likely to make a meaningful difference in some jurisdictions and not
others, which counsels toward local, not national reform. Second, even in
locations where a sizeable majority of potential jurors would convict in an
acquaintance rape case, fewer than 50% of juries may reach the same result.
This supports the conventional explanation for why prosecutors are unlikely
to bring charges in these cases: they are too likely to lose.
As an Appendix, I include the code for the JurySim algorithm. This
program provides a tool for prosecutors and scholars to understand how close
acquaintance rape cases will be in different communities. With modification,
it can also allow legislators to determine how effective an explicit “nomeans-no” law might be in communities of interest within their state.
A. The Conversation About Acquaintance Rape
Much legal scholarship on acquaintance rape has focused on whether
laws should be changed to define sex where a woman says “no” but does not
physically resist as rape.160 The traditional, common law definition of rape—
which still governs in many states161—requires the defendant to have acted
not only without the victim’s consent, but also with “force or threat of
159

See Leigh Bienen, Rape III — National Developments in Rape Reform
Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 170, 171 (1980) (“The articulated purposes of
the new laws are to increase the number of rape convictions and to ensure that the
interests of victims are respected in the criminal justice process.”). Increasing
prosecutions and convictions is not, however, the only goal of law reform. For
example, rape shield laws aim to encourage reporting and protect survivors from
embarrassment, see Myka Held & Juliana McLaughlin, Rape & Sexual Assault, 15
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 155, 171 (2014), and the Prison Rape Elimination Act
addresses a pervasive problem in our prisons, see Karri Iyama, “We Have Tolled the
Bell for Him”: An Analysis of the Prison Rape Elimination Act and California's
Compliance as It Applies to Transgender Inmates, 21 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 23, 38
(2012). Even during the reform movement, some suggested a lack of coherence in
goals. See Research into Violent Behavior: Overview and Sexual Assaults, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis
and Co-operation of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
427 (1978) (statement of Jan Ben Dor, C.S.W.), quoted in Bienen, supra, at 177.
160
See Kahan, supra note 126, at 745–49.
161
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 152, at 15 (“That said, a survey of rape laws
shows that many states expressly define rape as requiring force, while others define
rape as sex without consent but then include force as a component of non-consent.”).
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force.”162 “Force” is defined as behavior that overcomes the physical
resistance of the victim;163 and “threat of force” is behavior that would put a
woman in “reasonable fear” of physical injury.164 If a woman does not
physically resist—if she only says “no,” or otherwise verbally resists—the
man’s actions do not formally fit under the definition of rape. Indeed, courts
have enforced these laws, finding that rape does not encompass sexual
intercourse where the woman verbally expresses non-consent but does not
physically resist.165 Also, in most jurisdictions, if the man made a
“reasonable mistake” about the woman’s consent, he has a defense to the
crime of rape.166
Scholars have therefore debated whether this standard definition of
“rape” should be changed and, if so, what would be the most effective way to
reform rape law. Dan Kahan categorizes these arguments into three
positions.167 The standard feminist critique of traditional rape law says these
laws should be changed because they originate from and perpetuate false and
harmful sex stereotypes.168 These stereotypes hold that in normal sexual
relationships, men are aggressors, and women, naturally ambivalent, are
aroused by this aggression.169 Laws that reinforce these stereotypes reinforce
male domination over women and subordinate women’s sexual autonomy.170
Further, the mistake-of-fact defense privileges a man’s perception of consent
over a woman’s intent to withhold it.171 The conventionalist defense of the
common law definition of rape replies that the law reflects actual behavioral
norms: women really do sometimes say “no” when they mean to consent.172
Because several studies have shown that some women actually engage in
162

2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.1(a) at 605 (2d ed.

2003).
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See id. § 17.14(a), at 639–40.
See id. § 17.3(b), at 624–26.
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See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164–65 (Pa. 1994).
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Beatrice Diehl, Note, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’
Duty, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 515–16 (2015); Douglas N. Husak & George C.
Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW &
PHIL. 95, 95 (1992).
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See Kahan, supra note 126, at 745–53.
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Id. at 746.
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See JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE: SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 67–76 (2007); Kahan,
supra note 126, at 745.
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See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE? ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 62–63 (2005); Kahan, supra note 126, at 747.
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Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 653 (1983); Kahan, supra note 126, at
747.
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See Husak & Thomas, supra note 166, at 122; Kahan, supra note 126, at 747–
48.
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“token resistance,”173 it may be reasonable for a man to perceive consent in
the face of verbal resistance. He should not be held criminally responsible if
he errs in this perception.174 Finally, norm-reconstructionists assert that
while women may actually engage in token resistance, the law should
privilege the rights of women who mean to withhold consent, and it should
work to change the norms underlying the phenomenon of token resistance.175
The law should insist that it is per se unreasonable to ignore a woman’s
words.176 Legislatures should adopt a strict “no-means-no” rule.177
Other scholars have assumed a problem with the current state of
acquaintance rape prosecution and have argued for specific legal or
procedural reforms. Kahan has previously argued that juries might be more
willing to impose civil penalties on acquaintance rapists, and the regular
imposition of civil liability should change the norms that currently hinder
successful acquaintance rape prosecution.178 Similarly, Katharine Baker has
suggested that by using Title IX to treat rape as a civil wrong, the
Department of Education may succeed in changing “the norm of male
entitlement,”179 perhaps eventually enabling criminal enforcement. Ian
Ayres and Baker have suggested creating a new crime of “reckless sexual
conduct;” a defendant would be guilty of this crime if the jury found that he
had sexual intercourse without a condom during a first-time sexual encounter
with a woman.180 Consent to unprotected sex would be an affirmative
defense, but the defendant would need to prove consent by a preponderance
of the evidence.181 Stephen Schulhofer has proposed dividing sexual abuse
into two offenses: “rape,” which would include an element of force, and
“sexual abuse” or “sexual misconduct,” which would cover interference with
173

See, e.g., Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Carie S. Rodgers, Token Resistance to
Sex: New Perspectives on an Old Stereotype, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 443, 448 tbl.1
(1998) (Although a majority of female respondents reported engaging in token
resistance, only 15% of women produced non-fictitious narratives that met the
definition of token resistance).
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See Husak & Thomas, supra note 166, at 123–24; Kahan, supra note 126, at
748–49.
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See Kahan, supra note 126, at 750.
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See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 102–03 (1987).
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Id.; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1182 (1986).
178
See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 221, 222 (2015); see also Krista M. Anderson, Twelve Years Post Morrison:
State Civil Remedies and a Proposed Government Subsidy to Incentivize Claims by
Rape Survivors, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 223, 257 (2013) (proposing that
governments subsidize rape survivors’ civil suits).
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See Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 599, 599 (2005).
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Id.
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a woman’s autonomy through nonviolent conduct.182 Others have argued for
an “affirmative consent” standard.183
Those who propose procedural reforms try to circumvent juries’
resistance to convict acquaintance rapists. Donald Dripps has suggested
instituting a juryless sex crimes court to try rape cases where the woman did
not consent but did not physically resist.184 To comply with the Supreme
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, these courts could impose
sentences of up to only six months.185 Baker has suggested that universities
could shift social norms by imposing public shaming sanctions on
acquaintance rapists: instead of facing jail time, college men who rape would
be banned from team activities and forced to wear an article of clothing that
would label them as a rapist.186 Others suggest handling rape cases through a
process of restorative justice.187 All of these suggestions assume that juries,
as they stand, are insufficient institutions for acquaintance rape prosecution.
While the most innovative reforms suggested by these scholars have not
been put into action, several states have reformed their rape laws,
criminalizing intercourse without consent.188 Wisconsin instituted rape law
reform in 1975 with a statute making “sexual intercourse with a person
without the consent of that person” a felony.189 After the Berkowitz
acquaintance rape case,190 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
college student who had sex with a woman despite her verbal protestations
could not be convicted of rape,191 Pennsylvania reformed its rape law. The
182
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See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure
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Comment, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
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See infra Part III.B.
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commonwealth enacted a definition of “forcible compulsion” that includes
“intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or
implied.”192 It also created a new crime, “sexual assault”: “sexual intercourse
. . . with [another person] without [that person’s] consent.”193 While the
penalty for sexual assault is less than the penalty for rape, it is greater than
the penalty for “indecent assault,” the conviction Berkowitz ultimately
received.194 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that non-consensual
penetration satisfies the “physical force” requirement of the state’s rape
law.195 California now requires colleges that receive state funding for
financial aid to adopt a sexual assault policy that incorporates an “affirmative
consent” standard.196
Despite these reforms, however, acquittal rates are still unusually high
for rape overall and for acquaintance rape in particular.197 Legislators who
write rape reform laws would therefore benefit from additional information
on what factors contribute to a law’s effectiveness in attaining convictions.198
Prosecutors, too, will want to know the circumstances under which a trial is
likely to result in a conviction. When is a case really a close case, when is it
a probable win, and when is it a sure loss? And scholars who analyze the
cultural factors that influence acquaintance rape law and recommend law
reforms will be interested in the same questions: where and under what
circumstances will a jury convict a man who had sex with a woman without
her consent? A recent Cultural Cognition Project study begins to answer
these questions,199 but computer simulations of jury deliberation allow
lawyers, legislators, and scholars to make more informed estimates about
how these cases will play out in court. First, I review the cultural cognition
study. I then run through some useful computer simulations of an
acquaintance rape case, showing the probability that juries will convict under
different conditions and describing who can benefit from this information.
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B. The Berkowitz Case

The Cultural Cognition Project used the facts of Berkowitz, the
Pennsylvania case, as a stimulus for a study of what causes people to
perceive consent in an acquaintance rape case.200
1. Facts of the Case
Pennsylvania’s law reform came on the heels of a much discussed
acquaintance rape case, Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.201 The defendant was a
male college sophomore, Robert Berkowitz, and the complainant was a
female sophomore at the same college who had friends in common with
Berkowitz.202 On the afternoon of the non-consensual sex, the victim had a
martini and went to a dormitory to meet her boyfriend, with whom she had
argued the night before.203 Seeing that her boyfriend had not arrived, she
went upstairs to visit her friend Earl, Berkowitz’s roommate.204 Earl wasn’t
in the room but Berkowitz was, and they talked for a while, she sitting on the
floor and he on the bed.205 He got off the bed, pushed the victim back, and
began kissing her.206 She said, “Look, I gotta go. I’m going to meet [my
boyfriend],” but he persisted.207 The victim then said “no.”208 She continued
to say “no” and “no, I gotta go, let me go,” as he touched her breasts and
attempted to make her perform oral sex on him.209 He got up and locked the
door.210 Berkowitz moved the victim to the bed, removed her sweatpants,
and had sex with her.211 After the intercourse, Berkowitz said, “Wow, I
guess we just got carried away,” to which the victim replied, “No, we didn’t
get carried away, you got carried away.”212 The victim left Berkowitz’s room
and raced to her boyfriend in the dormitory lounge.213 She began crying, and
soon after, she and her boyfriend called the police.214
200
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Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per
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At trial, Berkowitz told the court that while the victim had said no, her
actions and her tone had indicated consent, even encouragement, and he had
stopped the intercourse as soon as he realized she was unhappy.215 The
complainant maintained that she did not consent.216 Even though “forcible
compulsion” was an element of rape in Pennsylvania, a jury convicted
Berkowitz of rape and indecent assault.217 On appeal, the Superior Court
overturned the rape conviction, saying that while the victim’s protestations
might be sufficient to show that she did not consent, nothing in the record
showed forcible compulsion.218 The Superior Court remanded for a new trial
on the indecent assault conviction on evidentiary grounds.219 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on the rape
conviction but reinstated the jury verdict on the indecent assault charge.220
The decision set off a war between feminists on one side, who harshly
criticized the court’s decision,221 and commentators who supported the
court’s judgment.222 The legislature responded by expanding the definition
of forcible compulsion to include “intellectual, moral, emotional or
psychological force, either express or implied,”223 and by creating a new
intermediate offense, “sexual assault,” defined as sexual intercourse without
the other person’s consent.224
2. The Cultural Cognition Study
A recent study by Dan Kahan, as part of the work of the Cultural
Cognition Project, examined the factors that led individuals to perceive that
Berkowitz reasonably understood the victim to be expressing consent.225
Subjects in the study read the facts of the Berkowitz case taken from the
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
215
Id. at 1341.
216
See id. (noting appellant’s story “differed only as to the consent involved”).
217
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220
See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994).
221
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movement in the last several years”).
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Nancy E. Roman, Scales of Justice Weigh Tiers of Sexual Assault; State May
Reform Rape Law, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A8 (quoting Camille Paglia,
Professor, Univ. of the Arts, as saying the case was “not even remotely about rape”).
See Kahan, supra note 126, at 741.
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See Kahan, supra note 126, at 731–32, 769–71.
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Superior Court opinion, with names changed.226 They were then presented
with one of four legal definitions of rape—(1) the common law definition,
(2) a strict liability definition where mistake is no defense, (3) a reform
definition based on the Wisconsin statute, and (4) a “no-means-no” definition
where saying “no” is sufficient to show non-consent—or no definition at
all.227 The subjects were then asked to agree or disagree with statements,
such as, “Despite what she said or might have felt after, Lucy really did
consent to sexual intercourse with Dave,” and “Dave should be found guilty
of rape.”228
The study found that subjects who subscribed to a hierarchical
worldview were more likely to agree that the defendant reasonably perceived
consent, and less likely to say that the defendant should be convicted of
rape.229 Conversely, subjects with an egalitarian worldview were more likely
to say that the defendant could not have reasonably perceived that the victim
had consented, and more likely to say that he was guilty of rape.230 In
contrast with popular perception, there was no significant difference between
how men and women, overall, perceived the case.231 Gender did, however,
interact with both age and cultural worldview, so older, hierarchical women
were more likely to perceive lack of consent than either younger, female
hierarchs or older, male hierarchs.232
Notably, the legal definition of rape presented to the subject did not
influence whether or not that person would have found the defendant guilty,
with one exception: the “no-means-no” condition did have a significant
effect, with more subjects in that condition saying that the defendant should
be convicted.233 However, culture had a substantially greater effect on
perceptions than the “no-means-no” law.234
Region also had a significant effect on perceptions, with northeastern and
far western jurors more likely to convict than jurors from the south or
mountain states.235 Although other variables that are correlated with cultural
226
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worldview, such as race, religion, and party affiliation, did not significantly
affect guilt votes independently,236 they are included in some of these
simulations to reflect any significant cumulative impact.
C. Simulating Acquaintance Rape Juries
JurySim can predict how juries will come out in cases similar to
Berkowitz under various specified conditions.
1. No-Means-No Law
The study found that a law explicitly stating that the word “no” defeats a
reasonable perception of consent did have a significant effect on subjects’
decisions.237 But it is not immediately clear from this that such a law would
significantly influence jury verdicts. In terms of MacCoun’s bBOP model, if
the community’s initial voting disposition lies far from the value of the
threshold parameter, b, the effect of such a law might be minimal. If a “nomeans-no” law makes jurors ten percentage points more likely to convict,
this will hardly matter if only 10% of the community initially wanted to vote
for conviction. With a threshold around 67% and a relatively high c, few
juries would convict in this community, with or without the law. On the
other hand, if the boost brings a community from 60% for conviction to 70%
for conviction, it could make a large difference in the number of juries
willing to convict. Perhaps it could make enough of a difference that
prosecutors would be more likely to bring these cases.
Say two acquaintance rapes take place on college campuses two
thousand miles apart: one in Binghamton, New York, and the other in
Bozeman, Montana.238 Binghamton is a small city of about 45,000 people in
upstate New York. It is approximately 79% white, 9% African-American,
and 5% Latino.239 The average household income is around $47,000.240
236

Id. at 779 tbl.1, 782.
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Bozeman is a small mountain state city of about 37,000 people. It is
approximately 90% white, 1% black, and 2.5% Latino.241 The average
household income is about over $58,000.242 Say the New York and Montana
legislatures are each considering passing a “no-means-no” law in response to
jury acquittal in these two cases.243 Will the laws work? Will juries in these
college towns reliably convict in cases like Berkowitz if the legislature
reforms the law?
To answer this question, I simulate juries in both towns. First, the
simulation runs a regression on the outcome measure “guilty,” “Dave should
be found guilty of rape.” There are six possible outcomes for “guilty,”
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” I therefore run an
ordered logistic regression instead of a regression that assumes a continuous
outcome variable. On the right hand side, I include only variables I can
easily determine the values for in both Binghamton and Bozeman: gender
ratio, racial distribution,244 income, urbanicity, and region, along with a
variable for whether there is a “no-means-no” law present. I simulate 200
models of this regression, and for each of those models, run 200 juries, each
Dollars):
Binghamton
city,
New
York,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
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241
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606000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607?slice=GEO~
1600000US3606607.
242
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the results of the model would plug in the racial composition of the jury pool, not
just the composition of the community.

2016

RESULTS OF DELIBERATION

207

pulled from a population distribution that mimics either Binghamton’s
demographics or Bozeman’s, to find the overall average probability of
conviction under four conditions: Binghamton without a law, Binghamton
with a law, Bozeman without a law, and Bozeman with a law. The results
follow.
0.8
0.7
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0.5
Binghamton

0.4
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0
Without No-Means-No

With No-Means-No

Figure 6. The effect of “no-means-no” law reform on juries in Binghamton,
New York and Bozeman, Montana. Before deliberation, an expected 62% of
individual Binghamton residents would have convicted, and 71% would have
convicted after the reform. In Bozeman,47% of individuals would have
voted to convict before the law, and 59% would likely vote to convict after
the law.
If the large confidence intervals in Figure 6 seem to suggest that the
model cannot tell us anything useful about how juries will vote after a nomeans-no law is passed, a probability density distribution graph better
highlights the value of the program. Figure 7 shows the density of
simulation results at each probability of conviction.
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Figure 7. Probability density distributions showing the effect of a “nomeans-no” law on juries in Binghamton and Bozeman.
Under the vast majority of Clarify’s simulated regression models, after a
no-means-no law is passed, a majority of juries in Binghamton and a
minority of juries in Bozeman would convict a defendant like Berkowitz.
Without a no-means-no law, even in a northeastern city like Binghamton,
it is most likely that a minority of juries would convict. However, after a law
is instituted, under most simulated models, a majority would convict. While
a prosecutor might still be hesitant to bring charges against those odds, they
are much better than the odds without the law reform. In Bozeman, on the
other hand, more juries are likely to convict with a “no-means-no” law than
they are without one; however, the odds are fairly low under both conditions.
Prosecutors might be very hesitant to bring this sort of case to trial in
Bozeman.
This distribution hints that perhaps we should not have a national policy
on law reform, since its effectiveness depends on the city and state where the
charges are brought. Instead, new laws will be most effective in places that
are already heavily egalitarian. State legislators should consider their
location before passing the no-means-no law. If the law fails, and
acquaintance rapists are regularly acquitted, the new law will reflect poorly
on the local government, and the effort would have used time and money
inefficiently. Therefore, legislators in already hierarchical states should
consider one of the other norm reconstruction techniques—perhaps civil
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liability or shaming sanctions—to get a state full of constituents who are
willing to convict acquaintance rapists. Only then should the legislature
introduce a true “no-means-no” model. In places more like Binghamton,
however, this sort of law reform could be effective today.
Prosecutors operating under a common law definition of rape, a
Wisconsin-style reform statute, or a “no-means-no” statute will be able to
anticipate their cases with JurySim. If they must have a minimal expectation
of winning before they charge a defendant with acquaintance rape, this
simulation could give them an idea of whether they have hit that threshold.
Unfortunately, the error bars around JurySim’s point estimates are relatively
large. The simulation pulls a finite sample of juries from the community, but
more importantly, it is based on a limited model, one that does not perfectly
predict the likelihood that even an individual will vote for conviction. It may
make a very big difference to a prosecutor whether the likelihood of
conviction is 60% or 75%, and JurySim will not be able to tell that
prosecutor what the precise likelihood of conviction is within a percentage
point or two. This is an inevitable limitation of the computer program; it is
only as precisely predictive as the underlying individual juror prediction
model.
2. A Cultural Model
The single most powerful influence on perceptions of consent was
cultural worldview, with 67% of egalitarians saying that they at least
“slightly” agreed that the defendant should be convicted of rape but only
50% of hierarchs responding the same way.245 The cultural effect also
interacted with respondent gender and age: only 45% of female hierarchs
over 60 years of age agreed that the defendant should be found guilty of
rape.246 By contrast, 52% of male hierarchs over 60 would have found the
defendant guilty, as would have 56% of female hierarchs under 30.247 On the
other end of the spectrum, about 76% of egalitarians under 30 years old
agreed the defendant was guilty.248 A model that predicts a verdict based on
culture, gender, age, and an interaction of the three is very powerful.
Most members of the public have not taken a cultural cognition
survey,249 and prosecutors cannot reliably plug their community’s average
“hierarchy” score into a simulation. However, prosecutors likely understand
the kind of community they live in. They have a sense of whether people in
the community support or oppose gay marriage and affirmative action,
245
246
247
248
249

Kahan, supra note 126, at 776 fig.3.
Id. at 776, 777 fig.4.
Id. at 776, 777 fig.4.
Id. at 777 fig.4.
Yet.
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whether their schools teach comprehensive sex education or abstinence only,
whether people gripe about their taxes going to fund welfare programs or
gripe about tax cuts going to the highest-earning Americans. Further, jury
consultants may perform community attitude surveys to gauge demographic
and attitudinal distributions.250 They therefore may be able to estimate
whether the community is more or less hierarchical than average. If they are
able to estimate local levels of hierarchical worldview, they could use a
cultural worldview model.
The figure below (Figure 8) shows the effects of deliberation on the
probability of convicting an acquaintance rape defendant in two
communities. The first is, on average, one standard deviation above the
national mean in hierarchy, has an average age of 60 years old, and is 75%
female. The second is, on average, one standard deviation below the national
mean in hierarchy, has an average age of 30, and is 75% male.

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Egalitarian, Young,
Male

0.4

Hierarchical, Old,
Female

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Individuals

Juries

Figure 8. The effects of deliberation on an old, female, hierarchical
community and a young, male egalitarian community.
Deliberation exacerbates the difference between these two groups.
While about 50% of juries in the egalitarian group will convict, even though
about 40% of individuals in the hierarchical group would convict, likely less
than 10% of juries from this group agree that the defendant is guilty. What
seemed like a close case for individuals is not a close case when extrapolated
to juries.
250

See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 5, at 452 n.30.
infrequently used by prosecutors, however. See id. at 451 tbl.4.

Consultants are
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This simulation also suggests, more generally, that prosecutors may be
reluctant to bring these cases because they have an unacceptably low
acquittal rate. Even in an unusually—perhaps unrealistically—young and
egalitarian community, only about half of randomly selected juries would
convict a defendant similarly situated to Berkowitz. This insight supports the
conventional wisdom that prosecutors screen out “unconvictable” or even
uncertain cases, so as not to jeopardize their conviction rates.251
3. Full Demographic Model
A researcher with access to lots of demographic data or a prosecutor who
is less sensitive to culture and more sensitive to these statistics, would benefit
from a model that incorporates as many demographic characteristics as
possible. Variables not easily accessible from census reports, such as age
distribution of the jury-eligible population, education level, and religious and
political252 affiliations all may have effects on the probability that a person
will believe the defendant should be convicted. Many of these effects are
insignificant when isolated, but when cultural data is unavailable, and these
variables are appropriately correlated—a person who is Jewish is more likely
to be white,253 for example—their insignificant effects may add up to a
meaningful combined influence.254
This model could help the extremely well informed determine the
probability of conviction in specific locations, or it could apprise scholars of
the chances of conviction in unspecified “pro-conviction” and “pro-acquittal”
locations. The figure below (Figure 9), shows the difference between a
location high in factors that counsel toward a probable conviction and a
location high in factors that counsel toward a probable acquittal. The Pro251

See Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of
Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 295, 300 (1987) (theorizing that
prosecutors seek to avoid uncertainty, and a relationship between victim and
defendant may introduce uncertainty into prosecution); Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting
Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections,
38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 214, 220–21 (1991) (performing an ethnographic study and
finding that prosecutors look for “holes” in sexual assault cases and use those to
justify case rejection).
252
Information on voting patterns may be readily available. However, lack of
political affiliation is a very strong variable in these particular regressions, so
imputing to simulated jurors the political affiliation that corresponds with their
voting pattern might be misleading.
253
See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PEW RESEARCH CENTER SURVEY OF U.S. JEWS,
APP’X B 196 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/10/jewish-americansurvey-app-b-topline.pdf [https://perma.cc/38HB-YH6J].
254
Kahan notes that age and education have a significant combined effect. See
Kahan, supra note 126, at 782.
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Conviction community is disproportionately African-American, young,
educated, low-income, Jewish or non-religious, Democratic or Independent,
and entirely from the Northeast.255 The Pro-Acquittal community is
disproportionately white, old, uneducated, wealthy, Catholic or Protestant,
Republican or politically unaffiliated, and entirely from the South.256
0.9
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0.6
0.5

Pro-ConvicGon

0.4

Pro-AcquiZal

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Individuals

Juries

Figure 9. The effect of deliberation on two demographically-specified
communities: one approximately one standard deviation above the mean on
pro-conviction variables, and the other approximately one-standard deviation
above the mean on pro-acquittal variables.
The demographic model does a reasonably good job of replicating the
cultural model, with a substantial majority of juries in the pro-conviction
group estimated to convict and a small minority of juries in the pro-acquittal
community convicting. However, because the percent of individuals voting
to convict in the pro-conviction group is so close to b, 67%, deliberation
exacerbates small differences between the models, yielding large confidence
255

While both the northeast and far west are more pro-conviction than other
regions, because I am theoretically modeling a geographic community, I choose one
location for each run.
This community is 43% African-American, 20% Jewish and 32% non-religious,
57% Democrat and 31% independent, has an average age of 30.4 years, has an
average education of between 2 and 4 years of college, and has an average annual
income of approximately $20,000.
256
This community is 86% white, 35% protestant, 27% Catholic, and 23% other
Christian, 58% Republican, has an average age of 59.9 years, has an average
education of high school graduate, and has an average income of approximately
$80,000.
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intervals.
Overall, however, this indicates that parties with good
demographic information may be able to predict jury behavior nearly as well
as those with only good cultural information (and information about gender
and age).
4. A Minimal Information Model
If neither information about a community’s cultural values nor detailed
information about a community’s demographics is available, a prosecutor or
other interested party can always find basic information through the U.S.
Census website.257 This website shares, inter alia, the average household
income, racial distribution,258 and gender distribution of any municipality in
the country. That information, along with the community’s geographical
region and urbanicity, can be incorporated into a more basic model that
predicts the proportion of juries from the community who would convict in
an acquaintance rape case.
The figures below (Figures 10 & 11) show the likelihood of conviction
for two culturally divergent college towns—Berkeley, California and Oxford,
Mississippi—as predicted by the simple demographic model. Berkeley is a
relatively well-off city259 in the far west, where, at the time of this survey,
58% percent of the population was white, 10% was African-American, 17%
was Asian, and 10% was Latino “of any race.”260 Oxford is a less wealthy
city261 in the south, where 73% of the population was white, 21% was
African-American, 3% was Asian, and 2% was Latino.262
257
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Fact
Sheet,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts.
258
The census includes “Hispanic or Latino (of any race)” as a category, which
citizens are invited to check off in addition to a “race” category such as “white” or
“black or African-American.” Our data, however, includes “Hispanic” as a separate
race. These models include only non-Latino whites, African-Americans, and Asians
in those categories.
259
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted
Dollars):
Berkeley
city,
California,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.
260
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates – ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: Berkeley city, California,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/DP5YR5/1600000US0
606000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607?slice=GEO~
1600000US3606607.
261
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted
Dollars):
Oxford
city,
Mississippi,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
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Figure 10. The effect of deliberation on juries from Berkeley, California and
Oxford, Mississippi, modeled only with data available on the U.S. Census
website.

6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.
262
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates – ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: Oxford city, Mississippi,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/DP5YR5/1600000US0
606000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607?slice=GEO~
1600000US3606607.
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Figure 11. Probability density distributions showing the effect of
deliberation on juries from Berkeley and Oxford.
As we would expect, juries in Berkeley are more likely to convict than
juries in Oxford. Because the model is based on relatively little information,
however, the results could underestimate the differences between these two
cities. Berkeley is wealthy—a factor that, on its own, predicts acquittal—and
Oxford is fairly racially diverse—a factor that counsels toward conviction.
Other than the regional variable, there is little to show exactly how “liberal”
Berkeley is.
It seems quite possible, then, that the simple model
underestimates the likelihood of conviction in Berkeley and therefore
underestimates both the disparity in the probability of conviction in these two
cities and the polarizing effect over individual differences. However, the
simulation does reinforce the conclusion that these cases may be bad bets for
prosecutors, even in relatively egalitarian cities. It suggests that prosecutors
may not bring acquaintance rape cases because of a reasonable concern that,
even where a fair majority of the populace would support conviction, a
majority of randomly drawn juries will not convict.
However, this example also demonstrates the current limits on the model
for prosecutors: it is sensitive to slight differences in information, and
prosecutors, determining whether or not to send a case to trial, would want a
fairly precise estimate of the likelihood of conviction. With a better, fulldemographic model, a prosecutor can do fairly well. With a less substantial
model, a prosecutor may not feel comfortable relying on the results of the
computer program. A prosecutor could, however, refine the model over
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time, using a machine learning algorithm263 to tweak the parameters to better
replicate past results and predict future verdicts.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers, legislators, and scholars are all interested in how juries are
likely to come out under specified conditions. Lawyers may have strong
intuitions based on experience with the community. Legislators may have a
sense of what the voters want and therefore how the public is disposed. And
scholars may have data on factors that influence individual jurors. But all of
these people could benefit from a program that extrapolates findings of
individuals to jurors.
The program is far from perfect. First, it is only as good as the model on
which it is based and the information the user can provide. While a cultural
model of the acquaintance rape case produces fairly precise results, a
prosecutor may not have precise data on the cultural distribution of her
community; and while certain demographic data is easily available, it may
give an impoverished picture of the community. Second, its estimates, even
given relatively strong models, are not perfectly precise.
A “full
demographic model” with 200 simulated models and 200 juries per model
provides a confidence interval of up to about thirty percentage points. And
while the estimates for b and c used in this paper have at least some support,
small differences in these numbers can make significant differences in
predicted jury verdicts. Additional research, then, into the true values of
these parameters would help the model’s accuracy.
Even though the point estimates this program produces are imprecise, the
ranges it provides may be useful to lawyers and legislators. And with better
juror voting models, better model parameter estimates, and better
descriptions of the venire of interest, the model’s estimates can become both
more accurate and more precise. The program also makes headway toward
increasing the usefulness of studying individuals. By looking at the more
realistic deliberative situation, it begins to tell us how juror-influencing
variables play out in the real world.

263

See, e.g., Bernard Widrow & Martin E. Hoff, Adaptive Switching Circuits,
1960 IRE WESTERN ELECTRIC SHOW & CONVENTION RECORD, pt. 4, Aug. 23, 1960,
at
96–104, reprinted
in JAMES ANDERSON & EDWARD ROSENFELD,
NEUROCOMPUTING: FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH 123 (1988) (developing an adaptive
algorithm).
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APPENDIX: ANNOTATED SIMULATION CODE
This Appendix includes annotated code for JurySim, the program that
calculates the probability a jury will convict in an acquaintance rape case,
contingent on the demographic characteristics of a community, as in Figure
9. The code is written for Stata 14 but can be adapted to other versions of the
program. It requires two free, user-written programs: Clarify and ice. It
simulates acquaintance rape juries from a pro-conviction population using
the full demographic model but can be altered to accommodate other datasets
and populations. The code proceeds through the following nine steps:
1. The program runs a statistical model—an ordered logistic
regression—on the Cultural Cognition Project’s acquaintance rape
data set, to determine the effects of a set of specified variables on the
likelihood that an individual will vote to convict.
2. Clarify simulates 200 versions of this model. It thereby captures the
precision of the model within the variance of coefficients in the
simulated models. For each loop over steps 3 through 7, the program
uses a different simulated model, Mi.
3. The program specifies V, a population of jurors, or venire, with
desired demographic characteristics (percent male, average income,
etc.).
4. From this venire, the program draws 12 jurors—each with his or her
own characteristics.
5. The program uses Mi, the simulated ordered logistic regression
model, to simulate an individual “first-ballot” verdict for each of the
12 jurors. This produces an initial number of jurors, NC, that favor
conviction.
6. The program uses MacCoun’s bBOP formula to calculate the
probability that a jury with NC jurors initially favoring conviction
will, indeed, convict the defendant.
7. The program repeats steps 3 through 6 two hundred times, to
simulate two hundred juries. It then averages the probabilities of
conviction from all of these juries to find an overall probability that a
jury drawn from V will convict using simulated model Mi.
8. The program repeats steps 3 through 7 with another Mi.
9. After looping through all the Mis, the program averages all of the
probabilities of conviction, each obtained at a unique Mi. It reports
this as the overall probability of conviction.
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** STEP 1. Running a regression on the data to derive a model
**
** Call up the acquaintance rape data set and set file
directory. Drop observations from the “no-means-no” condition.
**
clear
cd "/file_location/"
use “date_rape_recoded.dta"
set more off
drop if nmnlaw == 1
** Derive a correlation matrix, showing how variables of
interest correlate within the population. This will allow you
to simulate more realistic jurors. For example, low-income
jurors will be more likely to be low-education jurors. **
corr male female white black other_minority age income educ
urbanicity
jewish
protestant
catholic
other_christian
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent
no_major_party northeast midwest farwest mountain south
matrix cm = r(C)
** Find the means of the variables. This will allow you to pull
from a nationally-representative sample or compare a community
to the nation as a whole.**
mean male female white black other_minority age income educ
urbanicity
jewish
protestant
catholic
other_christian
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent
no_major_party northeast midwest farwest mountain south
matrix m = e(b)
** Find the standard errors of the variables. **
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix

S = diag(vecdiag(e(V)))
sddiag = cholesky(S)
sdp = vecdiag(sddiag)
sd = sqrt(e(N))*sdp
minisd = .55*sd

** Specify the mean values of the variables in your desired
population. Here, I have two matrices: one for a population
likely to convict, and another population likely to acquit. The
national mean for each variable is next to the variable name.**
matrix
mconv
=
(/*male
0.4787986*/.49,
/*female
0.5212014*/.51, /*%white 0.7385159*/.3, /*%black 0.1157244*/.4,
/*other_min
0.1457597*/.3,
/*age
46.30742*/30,
/*income
7.484982*/3.9,
/*educ
3.35159*/4.76,
/*urban
2.768551*/3,
/*%jew 0.0159011*/.3, /*%protestant 0.2985866*/.10, /*%catholic
0.2164311*/.1,
/*%other_christ
0.1704947*/.1,
/*%non_jc
0.0865724*/.15,
/*%
no_relig
0.2120141*/.25,
/*%repub
0.2941696*/.2, /*%dem 0.4028269*/.55, /*%indep 0.2535336*/.4,
/*%no_party
0.0459364*/.18,
/*%northeast
0.1563604*/1,
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/*%midwest 0.2438163*/0, /*%farwest 0.1634276*/0, /*%mountain
0.0644876*/0, /*%south 0.3621908*/0)
matrix
macq
=
(/*male
0.4787986*/.51,
/*female
0.5212014*/.49,
/*%white
0.7385159*/.7,
/*%black
0.1157244*/.20, /*other_min 0.1457597*/.20, /*age 46.30742*/60,
/*income
7.484982*/11,
/*educ
3.35159*/2.0,
/*urban
2.768551*/2,
/*%jew
0.0159011*/.1,
/*%protestant
0.2985866*/.32, /*%catholic 0.2164311*/.29, /*%other_christ
0.1704947*/.27,
/*%non_jc
0.0865724*/.1,
/*%
no_relig
0.2120141*/.15, /*%repub 0.2941696*/.45, /*%dem 0.4028269*/.2,
/*%indep
0.2535336*/.1,
/*%no_party
0.0459364*/.25,
/*%northeast 0.1563604*/0, /*%midwest 0.2438163*/0, /*%farwest
0.1634276*/0, /*%mountain 0.0644876*/0, /*%south 0.3621908*/1)
** Use multiple imputation to fill gaps in your data set. This
will create several additional data sets with simulated values
for absent variable observations. **
mi set mlong
ice guilty male white black age income educ urbanicity
jewish protestant catholic other_christian non_judeochristian
republican democrat independent northeast midwest farwest
mountain, m(5) replace cmd(guilty urbanicity educ:ologit, male
white
black
jewish
protestant
catholic
other_christian
non_judeochristian republican democrat independent northeast
midwest
farwest
mountain:logit,
age
income:regress)
saving(fulldemog_imputed, replace)
clear
use fulldemog_imputed
gen _j= _mj
gen _i = _mi
misplit, clear
** Run an ordered logit regression on the imputed data sets,
predicting the 6-tiered variable “guilty” using specified
demographic variables. Clarify will save 1,000 simulated models
of this regression. **
estsimp ologit guilty male white black age income educ
urbanicity
jewish
protestant
catholic
other_christian
non_judeochristian republican democrat independent northeast
midwest
farwest
mountain,
mi(_mitemp2
_mitemp3
_mitemp4
_mitemp5 _mitemp6)
** Store Clarify’s simulated models. **
estimates save ologmat, replace
keep b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16
b17 b18 b19 b20 b21 b22 b23 b24
save clarifybs, replace
** STEP 2. Choosing a Clarify model Mi. **
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** This step formally occurs later in the code. The next
several steps will define a program that you will run through
200 times, each with a different Mi.**
program define demogcrimo, rclass
version 14.1
drop _all
** STEPS 3 and
distribution. **

4.

Simulating

jurors

from

a

specified

** Draw jurors from a normal distribution. Specify the
demographic variables that will characterize your jurors.
Specify the number of jurors, (currently n(12) means there are
12 jurors), the correlation matrix between the variables
(currently cm, the matrix you derived above), the means of each
variable (currently set at mconv, the pro-conviction jury
defined above), and the standard deviations of your variables
(currently set at minisd). **
drawnorm male female white black other_minority age income
educ urbanicity jewish protestant catholic other_christian
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent
no_major_party northeast midwest farwest mountain south, n(12)
corr(cm) means(mconv) sds(minisd)
** Replace all of the normal variables with binary or
categorical variables. This will take the variable in any
mutually-exclusive set with the highest value and set that
equal to 1. So if protestant = .56 and catholic = .52, this
will change protestant to 1 and catholic to 0. This means that
the mean of your normal distribution will not necessarily be
the population average of the variable. You may need to play
around with the means to replicate the desired population. The
algorithm also reassigns the age of anyone under 18 to either
18, 19, 20, or 21.**
gen agez = uniform()
replace age = 18 if age < 18 & agez < .25
replace age = 19 if age < 18 & agez >= .25 & agez < .50
replace age = 20 if age < 18 & agez >= .50 & agez < .75
replace age = 21 if age < 18 & agez >= .75
replace male = 1 if male > female
replace male = 0 if female > male
replace female = 1 - male
replace white = 1 if white > black & white > other_minority
replace black = 0 if white == 1
replace other_minority = 0 if white == 1
replace black = 1 if black > white & black > other_minority
replace white = 0 if black == 1
replace other_minority = 0 if black == 1
replace other_minority = 1 if other_minority > black &
other_minority > white
replace black = 0 if other_minority == 1
replace white = 0 if other_minority == 1
replace income = 1 if income < 1.5
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2 if income > 1.5 & income < 2.5
3 if income > 2.5 & income < 3.5
4 if income > 3.5 & income < 4.5
5 if income > 4.5 & income < 5.5
6 if income > 5.5 & income < 6.5
7 if income > 6.5 & income < 7.5
8 if income > 7.5 & income < 8.5
9 if income > 8.5 & income < 9.5
10 if income > 9.5 & income < 10.5
11 if income > 10.5 & income < 11.5
12 if income > 11.5 & income < 12.5
13 if income > 12.5 & income < 13.5
14 if income > 13.5

replace educ = 1 if educ < 1.5
replace educ = 2 if educ > 1.5 & educ < 2.5
replace educ = 3 if educ > 2.5 & educ < 3.5
replace educ = 4 if educ > 3.5 & educ < 4.5
replace educ = 5 if educ > 4.5 & educ < 5.5
replace educ = 6 if educ > 5.5
replace urbanicity = 3
**replace urbanicity = 2
replace jewish = 1 if jewish > protestant & jewish >
catholic
&
jewish
>
other_christian
&
jewish
>
non_judeochristian & jewish > no_relig
replace protestant = 0 if jewish == 1
replace catholic = 0 if jewish == 1
replace other_christian = 0 if jewish == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 0 if jewish == 1
replace no_relig = 0 if jewish == 1
replace protestant = 1 if protestant > jewish & protestant
> catholic & protestant > other_christian & protestant >
non_judeochristian & protestant > no_relig
replace jewish = 0 if protestant == 1
replace catholic = 0 if protestant == 1
replace other_christian = 0 if protestant == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 0 if protestant == 1
replace no_relig = 0 if protestant == 1
replace catholic = 1 if catholic > jewish & catholic >
protestant
&
catholic
>
other_christian
&
catholic
>
non_judeochristian & catholic > no_relig
replace jewish = 0 if catholic == 1
replace protestant = 0 if catholic == 1
replace other_christian = 0 if catholic == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 0 if catholic == 1
replace no_relig = 0 if catholic == 1
replace other_christian = 1 if other_christian > jewish &
other_christian > protestant & other_christian > catholic &
other_christian
>
non_judeochristian
&
other_christian
>
no_relig
replace jewish = 0 if other_christian == 1
replace protestant = 0 if other_christian == 1
replace catholic = 0 if other_christian == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 0 if other_christian == 1
replace no_relig = 0 if other_christian == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 1 if non_judeochristian >
jewish & non_judeochristian > protestant & non_judeochristian >
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catholic
&
non_judeochristian
>
other_christian
non_judeochristian > no_relig
replace jewish = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1
replace protestant = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1
replace catholic = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1
replace other_christian = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1
replace no_relig = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1
replace no_relig = 1 if no_relig > jewish & no_relig
protestant & no_relig > catholic & no_relig > other_christian
no_relig > non_judeochristian
replace jewish = 0 if no_relig == 1
replace protestant = 0 if no_relig == 1
replace catholic = 0 if no_relig == 1
replace other_christian = 0 if no_relig == 1
replace non_judeochristian = 0 if no_relig == 1
replace democrat = 1 if democrat > republican & democrat
independent & democrat > no_major_party
replace republican = 0 if democrat == 1
replace independent = 0 if democrat == 1
replace no_major_party = 0 if democrat == 1
replace republican = 1 if republican > democrat
republican > independent & republican > no_major_party
replace democrat = 0 if republican == 1
replace independent = 0 if republican == 1
replace no_major_party = 0 if republican == 1
replace independent = 1 if independent > democrat
independent > republican & independent > no_major_party
replace democrat = 0 if independent == 1
replace republican = 0 if independent == 1
replace no_major_party = 0 if independent == 1
replace no_major_party = 1 if no_major_party > democrat
no_major_party > republican & no_major_party > independent
replace democrat = 0 if no_major_party == 1
replace republican = 0 if no_major_party == 1
replace independent = 0 if no_major_party == 1
replace northeast = 1 if northeast > midwest & northeast
farwest & northeast > mountain & northeast > south
replace midwest = 0 if northeast == 1
replace farwest = 0 if northeast == 1
replace mountain = 0 if northeast == 1
replace south = 0 if northeast == 1
replace midwest = 1 if midwest > northeast & midwest
farwest & midwest > mountain & midwest > south
replace northeast = 0 if midwest == 1
replace farwest = 0 if midwest == 1
replace mountain = 0 if midwest == 1
replace south = 0 if midwest == 1
replace farwest = 1 if farwest > northeast & farwest
midwest & farwest > mountain & farwest > south
replace northeast = 0 if farwest == 1
replace midwest = 0 if farwest == 1
replace mountain = 0 if farwest == 1
replace south = 0 if farwest == 1
replace mountain = 1 if mountain > northeast & mountain
midwest & mountain > farwest & mountain > south
replace northeast = 0 if mountain == 1
replace midwest = 0 if mountain == 1

&

>
&

>

&

&

&

>

>

>

>
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replace farwest = 0 if mountain == 1
replace south = 0 if mountain == 1
replace south = 1 if south > northeast & south > midwest &
south > farwest & south > mountain
replace northeast = 0 if south == 1
replace midwest = 0 if south == 1
replace farwest = 0 if south == 1
replace mountain = 0 if south == 1
** STEP 5. Use one of the simulated ordered logit models to
simulate a first-ballot vote for each juror. **
** Recall the Clarify ologit estimation. **
estimates use ologmat
append using clarifybs
** The next several lines will include a global variable "i."
The code loops through 200 values of “i,” one for each Mi, the
simulated ordered logit models that Clarify generated. **
** Generate a “gscore” for each juror based on the coefficients
in the randomly selected line of simulated parameters. This
“gscore” is the output of the ordered logit regression in model
Mi. **
gen gscore = b1[$i]*male + b2[$i]*white + b3[$i]*black
b4[$i]*age + b5[$i]*income + b6[$i]*educ + b7[$i]*urbanicity
b8[$i]*jewish
+
b9[$i]*protestant
+
b10[$i]*catholic
b11[$i]*other_christian
+
b12[$i]*non_judeochristian
b13[$i]*republican + b14[$i]*democrat + b15[$i]*independent
b16[$i]*northeast
+
b17[$i]*midwest
+
b18[$i]*farwest
b19[$i]*mountain

+
+
+
+
+
+

** Generate the probability that the juror falls into each of
the six guilt “tiers.” If the juror falls into the fourth
through sixth tier, a vote of “guilty” will be imputed to that
juror. These generated probabilities are based on the ordered
logit "cuts" in Mi. **
gen prg1 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b20[$i]))
gen prg2 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b21[$i]))
exp(gscore - b20[$i]))
gen prg3 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b22[$i]))
exp(gscore - b21[$i]))
gen prg4 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b23[$i]))
exp(gscore - b22[$i]))
gen prg5 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b24[$i]))
exp(gscore - b23[$i]))
gen prg6 = 1 - 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b24[$i]))

-

1/(1

+

-

1/(1

+

-

1/(1

+

-

1/(1

+

** Pick a random number. If it is higher than the sum of the
probabilities that the juror will fall into “guilt tiers” one
through three, then impute an initial vote of “guilty” to that
juror. **
gen z = uniform()
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gen guilty = 0
replace guilty = 1 if z > (prg1 + prg2 + prg3)
keep in 1/12

** Display and save the percent of jurors in the twelve person
jury who initially vote “guilty.” **
summarize guilty
return scalar igmean = r(mean)
** End the program that will run 200 times for each Mi. **
end
** STEPS 2 & 8. The next section loops through Mis. It defines
a global variable “i,” which signifies the model Mi. For each
“i” in the loop, the program generates 200 juries, averages
their conviction probabilities, and adds that average to a file
containing
all
of
the
mean
conviction
probabilities,
"avgprobic.dta." **
global i 13
while $i <= 212 {
** STEP 6 & 7. Simulate 200 juries and plug them into the bBOP
formula. **
disp `i'
** Simulate 200 juries; reps(200) means 200 juries. **
simulate igmean=r(igmean), reps(200): demogcrimo
gen numconvict = 12*igmean
gen numacquit = 12 - numconvict
gen pctconvict = igmean
gen pctacquit = 1 - igmean
** Choose values for the bBOP parameters b and c. **
gen c = 18
gen b = .67
** Use the bBOP
conviction. **

formula

to

generate

a

probability

of

gen convprob = 1/(1 + exp(c*(b - pctconvict)))
** Summarize "convprob." This will save the average conviction
probability. **
summarize convprob
clear
** I call up the
probabilities. **

file

with

all

of

the

average

conviction
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use "avgprobic.dta"
** Because it was based on Mi, you have produced the “ith”
conviction probability. Store it in the “ith” cell. **
replace avgprobic = r(mean) in $i
save, replace
** Proceed to the next value of “i” in the loop. If you have
just used Clarify’s eighth simulated model, you will now repeat
all
of
these
steps—simulating
200
juries,
having
them
deliberate, finding their average probability of conviction—for
the ninth simulated model. **
global i = $i + 1
}
** STEP 9. Report the average probability of conviction. **
summarize avgprobic
centile(avgprobic), centile(2.5,97.5)
** Clear your tracks. **
program drop demogcrimo
replace avgprobic = .
save, replace

